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Reporting Certainty 
James A. Macleod* 
Legal theorists, judges, and legal writing instructors persistently 
decry the assertions of certainty—”obviously X,” “undoubtedly Y,” 
etc.—that litter judicial opinions. According to the conventional view, the 
rhetoric of certainty that these assertions epitomize is disingenuous. It also 
reflects, and even encourages, poor judicial decision-making. And as if that 
were not enough, it is so unpersuasive that it is counter-persuasive: it 
signals uncertainty, nonobviousness, etc.—the exact opposite of what its 
author intends. Judges, for these and other reasons, should abstain from 
needless assertions of certainty and the myopic thinking they evince. That 
much is certain. 
Yet the rhetoric of certainty persists. Why? To what effect? And how 
concerned should we be? The typical answers’ logic and empirical 
assumptions have largely escaped serious scrutiny. This Article begins to 
fill the gap. It identifies five conventional accounts of the causes, effects, 
and (uniformly negative) normative implications of judicial certainty 
rhetoric. After highlighting some intuitive implausibilities in each 
account, the Article reports new empirical evidence, drawing on an 
original dataset concerning assertions of certainty and uncertainty in 
nearly 500 federal appellate opinions and 350 corresponding briefs. These 
new data cast further doubt on the conventional accounts and suggest an 
alternative account of judicial certainty rhetoric—one with very different 
normative implications. 
According to this Article’s new “efficient management” account, 
judges, constrained by individual reputation concerns, credibly and 
sincerely report certainty relative to a rhetorical baseline that their 
primary audiences readily presume. Judges thereby provide useful 
information to other judges, lawyers, and litigants, efficiently managing 
the judicial system in an era of expanding caseloads, without straying 
from their proper role. The Article draws from recent philosophical work 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For helpful conversations and 
comments, I thank Lisa Bernstein, Tom Ginsburg, Bert Huang, William H.J. Hubbard, 
Richard McAdams, Adam Samaha, Larry Solan, Lior Strahilevitz, and Nina Varsava. 
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in the field of “social epistemology” to argue that the practice of reporting 
relative certainty is not merely efficient, but also epistemically valuable, 
facilitating the judiciary’s truth-discovery goals. The overall implication 
is that judges should report their attendant degree of certainty more often, 
not less. Finally, the Article argues that, while it may well be desirable to 
shift the rhetorical baseline toward greater levels of expressed uncertainty, 
doing so may carry unintended consequences, such as (perhaps 
paradoxically) decreasing judicial deliberation and reducing a particular 
type of judicial minimalism. In the end, wherever the ideal rhetorical 
baseline might be, the case against reporting certainty is less certain than 
is typically suggested. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal theorists, judges, and legal writing instructors all cringe 
when judicial opinions (or, for that matter, litigants’ briefs)  
claim that their assertions are not merely true, but “obviously”  
true, “clearly” correct, “undoubtedly” right, and so on. 
Commentators strongly and uniformly disparage the “rhetoric of 
certainty” that such assertions epitomize.1 Judicial opinions 
routinely “overclaim[] certainty.”2 They are “notoriously—even 
comically—unequivocal,”3 “dress[ing] up” uncertain contentions4 
in a “vocabulary of apodictic certainty,”5 “inevitability,”6 and  
“claimed objectivity” that disingenuously “denies the complexity 
of the problem.”7 
 
 1. Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It When I See It”, 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1042 (1996) (“The 
typical . . . opinion is marked by a rhetoric of certainty.”); see also Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. 
Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson, Role (Im)morality, and the Ethics of Legal 
Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 1 n.3 (2000) (lamenting “the over-certainty on complex issues 
that characterizes too much legal rhetoric”). 
 2. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA. L. REV. 1545, 
1590 (1990); see also Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Simon, Psychological Model]; Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Judicial 
Overstating, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 411 (2013). 
 3. Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral Principles, 
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (2011). 
 4. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 73 (Paul Gewirtz ed., 
Michael Ansaldi trans., The Univ. of Chi. Press 1989) (1933); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND 
THE MODERN MIND 5–12 (1930) (arguing that certainty is not attainable in law); KENT 
GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 186 (2013) (observing that 
while a judicial opinion “may be the result of a very modest degree of conviction, it is usually 
written in terms of ultimate certainty” (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 
U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (1966))). 
 5. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 30 (1990); see also Richard 
A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 865 (1988) (“Most judicial 
opinions . . . imply that even the very toughest case has a right and a wrong answer and only 
a fool would doubt that the author of the opinion had hit on the right one.”). 
 6. Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
201, 213–16 (1990) (“The monologic voice, the interrogative mode, and the declarative tone 
build together in what might be called a rhetoric of inevitability.”); accord LLEWELLYN, supra 
note 4, at 8 (judicial opinions are typically “presented as simply inevitable, whatever doubts 
the panel may have had in arriving at it”). 
 7. Gewirtz, supra note 1; cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457, 466 (1897) (“[C]ertainty generally is illusion . . . .”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some 
Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1242 (1931) 
(asserting that legal certainty is “an illusion”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of 
Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2010 (2002) (“Opinions are written to make results 
seem determinate and value-free . . . .”); id. at 2012 (noting that Supreme Court “opinions are 
written to make it seem that there is only one correct result and that it was derived in a 
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According to the conventional view, such rhetoric is not merely 
disingenuous but also ineffective: words like “clearly” and 
“obviously” convey “little” or “no extra meaning.”8 Indeed, if they 
convey anything at all, it is that the proposition at issue is especially 
unclear or nonobvious—that is, “exactly [the] opposite [of] their 
original meaning.”9 Thus Bryan Garner states, “when a judge . . . 
 
formalistic fashion”); Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES: 
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2, 11 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (“[T]he 
rhetoric of certainty seems to result from the perceived need of judges to preserve the 
institutional authority of the court.”); Alex Stein, Law and the Epistemology of Disagreements, 
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 51, 96 (2018) (discussing judges’ “rhetoric of certainty”). 
 8. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, 
STRATEGY, AND STYLE 330 (5th ed. 2005) (“‘It is obvious’ and ‘clearly’ supply no extra 
meaning.”); MARY BARNARD RAY & JILL J. RAMSFIELD, LEGAL WRITING: GETTING IT RIGHT AND 
GETTING IT WRITTEN 205 (3d ed. 2000) (“[A]void modifiers that have little substantive 
meaning, such as . . . obviously.”); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL WRITING MANUAL: A 
POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 23 (2d ed. 2013) (instructing that judges “should . . . eliminate 
unnecessary adverbs such as ‘clearly[]’ [and] ‘plainly’”); see also, e.g., BRADLEY G. CLARY & 
PAMELA LYSAGHT, SUCCESSFUL LEGAL ANALYSIS AND WRITING: THE FUNDAMENTALS 102 (2d 
ed. 2006) (“Particularly avoid exaggeration through conclusory modifiers such as ‘clearly,’ 
‘plainly,’ . . . and the like.”); Nancy A. Wanderer, Writing Better Opinions: Communicating with 
Candor, Clarity, and Style, 54 ME. L. REV. 47, 53 (2002) (“To persuade its various audiences, 
including these most resistant ones, the court must convince them that it has considered all 
points of view, ‘that opposing evaluations of the case have been understood and seriously 
weighed.’ To make the losing party even more accepting of the result, the judge might grant 
the losing side a point or two. Regarding this approach, Professor Gibson comments, ‘When 
this suggestion is proposed to appellate judges, they nod in polite agreement. Is it not 
astonishing, then, how many opinions are written as if there were only one, very obvious, 
and utterly inescapable position, and that the position of the writer himself?’” (quoting 
Walker Gibson, Literary Minds and Judicial Style, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 922 (1961))  
(footnotes omitted)). 
 9. LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 289 (4th ed. 2015) (attributing 
the phenomenon to “generations” of “overuse” of such terms in legal writing); see also MARY 
BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 291 (5th ed. 2019) (“Clearly, 
obviously, of course, and it is evident that have been so overused that they go beyond having 
no meaning to having a negative meaning.”); Neil Daniel, Writing Tips, in 1 PERSPECTIVES: 
TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH & WRITING 87 (1993) (“Avoid clearly. The word is almost always 
the writer’s last resort when an argument is murky.”); LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: 
PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 186–87 (7th ed. 2018); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE 
WINNING BRIEF 520–21 (3d ed. 2014) (“‘Obviously, like other dogmatic words (clearly, 
undoubtedly, undeniably), is one that “lawyers tend to use when they are dealing with 
exceptionally obscure matters.”‘ . . . The words clearly and obviously . . . signal weakness. It’s 
paradoxical but true. (quoting BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 
627 (3d ed. 2011) (quoting GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 116 n.63 (1974)))); 
RICHARDSON R. LYNN, APPELLATE LITIGATION § 9.7, at 247 (2d ed. 1993) (“Argument by 
adverbs, such as ‘clearly’ and ‘obviously,’ indicates that the argument is not being fully 
developed.”); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: 
STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND STYLE § 25.3, at 320 (6th ed. 2009) (“Judges assume that 
expressions like these are used to cover up a lack of logical proof.”); Daniel M. Friedman, 
Winning on Appeal, in APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 129, 133–34 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., 
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begins a sentence with a term of utter conviction (Clearly, 
Undeniably, It is plain that . . .), the sentence that follows is likely to 
be dubious, unreasonable, and fraught with difficulties.”10 And in 
addition to being disingenuous and ineffective, certainty rhetoric in 
judicial opinions may evince, and even encourage, superficial 
 
1992) (“The claim that a particular statutory provision covers the case does not gain strength 
by stating that it ‘clearly,’ ‘plainly,’ or ‘patently’ does so. . . . Indeed, words like ‘patently’ or 
‘obviously’ suggest that what follows is the ipse dixit of the writer, rather than a necessary 
conclusion.”); Sarah E. Ricks & Jane L. Istvan, Effective Brief Writing Despite High Volume 
Practice: Ten Misconceptions That Result in Bad Briefs, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1113, 1118 n.17 (2007) 
(finding adverbs “such as ‘clearly’ or ‘obviously,’ do not strengthen legal writing and, in fact, 
often are considered red flags for logical leaps in the argument”); CLARY & LYSAGHT, supra 
note 8 (“[A]void exaggeration through conclusory modifiers such as ‘clearly,’ ‘plainly,’ 
‘very,’ ‘obviously,’ ‘outrageous,’ ‘unconscionable,’ and the like.”); Robert Barnes, Chief Justice 
Counsels Humility: Roberts Says Lawyers Must Put Themselves in Judges’ Shoes, WASH. POST, Feb. 
6, 2007, at A15 (“’We get hundreds and hundreds of briefs, and they’re all the same,’  [Chief 
Justice John] Roberts told a crowd . . . . ‘Somebody says, “My client clearly deserves to win, 
the cases clearly do this, the language clearly reads this,” blah, blah, blah. And you pick up 
the other side and, lo and behold, they think they clearly deserve to win.’ How about a little 
recognition that it’s a tough job? . . . ‘I mean, if it was an easy case, we wouldn’t have it.’”); 
see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING 
JUDGES 13 (2008) (“You’ll harm your credibility—you’ll be written off as a blowhard—if you 
characterize the case as a lead-pipe cinch . . . .”). This advice is not confined to the Supreme 
Court, where cases may be expected to be least clear as a matter of law. Circuit court judges 
express the same sentiment. See, e.g., Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 731 F.3d 584, 
584–85 (6th Cir. 2013) (Kethledge, J.) (listing “good reasons not to call an opponent’s 
argument ‘ridiculous,’” including “civility” and “the near-certainty that overstatement will 
only push the reader away”); CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PRACTICE HANDBOOK 237 (7th ed. 2001) 
(reporting that in a 2001 survey of California appellate court judges, seventy-three percent 
of the respondents agreed with this statement: “‘I notice, and it bothers me, when a brief uses 
adverbs like “clearly” and “obviously” to support arguments’”); Abbe R. Gluck & Richard 
A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1351 (2018) (“Many judges mentioned that lawyers’ 
efforts at zealous advocacy . . . often backfire and make them less helpful to the courts, 
with . . . both sides insisting their reading of the text is the only clear reading.”); Kristen K. 
Robbins, The Inside Scoop: What Federal Judges Really Think About the Way Lawyers Write, 8 J. 
LEGAL WRITING INST. 257 (2002). 
 10. GARNER, supra note 9, at 520 (quoting Gibson, supra note 8, at 925). 
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reasoning and decision-making,11 inadequate respect for litigants,12 
and other horribles paraded below in greater detail.13  
Yet despite its disparagement from all corners, the rhetoric 
seems, at least anecdotally, to continue unabated.14 The very same 
lawyers taught to avoid the rhetoric, and the very same judges 
advocating its abolition, continue to claim that their assertions are 
“obviously” correct, “beyond dispute,” and the like.15 This is 
puzzling, and raises several important questions. First, exactly how 
pervasive is this rhetoric of certainty? Second, when, by whom, and 
ultimately why, is it used—in short, what are its causes? Third, what 
effects, if any, does certainty rhetoric have on its audiences? And 
finally, in light of its causes and effects, what are its normative 
implications—would individual judges (and/or litigants) 
themselves be better off avoiding it, and, more importantly, would 
the judicial system as a whole be better without it? 
Although the literature is rife with cursory claims about the 
causes, effects, and normative undesirability of judicial and litigant 
 
 11. Simon & Scurich, supra note 2, at 419 (arguing that conclusory judicial certainty 
statements “blunt[] the thoroughness that befits the judicial practice”); cf. Robert A. Leflar, 
Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 810, 810 (1961) (“[T]he 
necessity for preparing a formal opinion assures some measure of thoughtful review of the 
facts in a case and of the law’s bearing upon them.”); Jeffery S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. 
Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 MICH. L. REV. 859, 874 (2010) (book review) (noting that 
judges explaining their decisions in writing “not only improves the decision-making  
process, but it also disciplines judges to ensure that their votes amount to more than intuition 
and impulse”). 
 12. See EMILY M. CALHOUN, LOSING TWICE: HARMS OF INDIFFERENCE IN THE SUPREME 
COURT (2011); Timothy P. O’Neill, Law and “The Argumentative Theory”, 90 OR. L. REV. 837, 
848 (2012) (“When a judicial opinion . . . is couched in completely unequivocal language, its 
message to the other side is: ‘You’re wrong. And, by the way, you are stupid and perhaps 
dishonest, too.’”); Simon & Scurich, supra note 2, at 421 (“Rather than emphasizing 
commonalities and broadening social consensus, the judicial one-sidedness pushes the 
opposing parties further apart. The judicial opinion, then, entrenches the boundaries that 
separate people; it solidifies parochialism and perpetuates pre-existing power 
arrangements.”); Wanderer, supra note 8, at 54 (“The reader must be treated as an equal, with 
respect.”); cf. Gibson, supra note 8, at 923. 
 13. See infra Section I.A. 
 14. See Simon, Psychological Model, supra note 2, at 8–11 (noting the Legal Realist 
attacks on certainty in judicial opinions and the persistence of certainty despite the attacks); 
sources cited supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
 15. Justice Scalia’s writings offer a particularly stark example. Compare, e.g., Scalia & 
Garner, supra note 9 (“You’ll harm your credibility—you’ll be written off as a blowhard—if 
you characterize the case as a lead-pipe cinch . . . .”), with, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2480, 2496 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the correct resolution of the case as 
“obvious—so obvious there would hardly be a need for the Supreme Court to hear a case 
about it,” and lamenting that the majority’s “of course quite absurd” decision comes out the 
other way). 
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certainty rhetoric, those claims rest on theoretical and empirical 
assumptions that have received little attention. Like the content of 
judicial opinions more generally—a subject some judicial behavior 
scholars consider “woefully understudied”16—the actual causes 
and effects of legal certainty rhetoric have received little systematic 
attention, leaving the normative case against certainty rhetoric 
surprisingly unsupported. This Article begins to address the gap in 
the literature. 
First, the Article identifies five theories of the causes and effects 
of certainty rhetoric that, in one form or another, undergird the 
prevailing disdain for judicial certainty rhetoric. These theories can 
be labeled and summarized as follows: (1) “misguided persuasion” 
(authors use certainty rhetoric in an ill-advised attempt to convince 
their readers); (2) “reactive escalation” (certainty rhetoric is an 
impulsive response to somebody else’s rhetorical provocation); (3) 
“extralegal communication style” (certainty rhetoric is bleed over 
from the author’s speaking and/or writing style in other contexts); 
(4) “power-grabbing” (judges use certainty rhetoric as a form of 
dicta to push the law in their favored direction); and (5) “legitimacy 
bolstering” (judges use certainty rhetoric in an effort to enhance 
perceptions of judicial legitimacy). 
After laying out the conventional theories, their normative 
implications, and the empirical predictions each generates, the 
 
 16. Frank B. Cross & James W. Pennebaker, The Language of the Roberts Court, 2014 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 853, 857 (2014) (claiming that the content of judicial opinions has been 
“‘woefully understudied’” in the context of judicial behavior literature) (quoting Emerson 
H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 517 (2006)); see also 
Keith Carlson et al., A Quantitative Analysis of Writing Style on the U.S. Supreme Court, 93 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2016) (“While judicial writing style often serves as fodder for 
commentary, it has rarely been subject to systematic study.”); Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of 
Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97 IOWA L. REV. 693, 738 (2012) (“The influence of a 
precedent . . . depends on the language of the opinion.”); Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the 
Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2017, 2072 (2016) (asserting that scholars 
studying judicial behavior “have long ignored the most obvious feature of what we study: 
the actual texts that judges produce”); Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. POL. 
261, 266 (2006); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: 
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 862 (2010); Jack Knight, Are 
Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1533 
(2009) (stressing the need to study “aspects of the opinions accompanying the votes”); Harry 
T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand 
the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1908–09 (2009); Edward 
Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Creating Legal Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1989, 1990 (1996); Kate 
O’Neill, Rhetoric Counts: What We Should Teach When We Teach Posner, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 
507, 509 (2009). 
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Article introduces new empirical data and evaluates each theory in 
light of those data. The data come from an exploratory study of 483 
published appellate court opinions and 344 corresponding briefs.17 
This study is the first to track assertions of certainty (ACs)—terms 
like “obviously” and “undoubtedly”18—and assertions of 
uncertainty (AUs)—terms like “uncertain,” “not obvious,” etc.19—
along with various case, litigant, and judge attributes that help shed 
light on the causes, effects, and normative implications of certainty 
rhetoric in the courts.20 
The data confirm and add precision to the view that, despite its 
being universally decried, certainty rhetoric is surprisingly 
pervasive in legal discourse.21 But the data appear not to support 
prevailing theories about its causes and effects. For example, 
certainty assertions, despite their reputation as a sign of 
unpersuasive or poorly reasoned writing, appear frequently in the 
best lawyers’ and best judges’ briefs and opinions,22 and they 
appear not to harm litigants’ chances of winning,23 nor to affect the 
number of citations an opinion garners.24 Dissenting opinions, 
notorious for over-claiming certainty precisely where it is least 
warranted,25 do indeed employ increased levels of certainty 
rhetoric compared to majority opinions, but they are also 
accompanied by an equally large increase in uncertainty statements 
(in both the dissent and the majority opinion), contrary to 
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See text accompanying infra notes 96–98. 
 19. See infra Section I.B.2.b. A few notes regarding terminology: As used throughout 
this Article, “ACs” and “AUs” are stand-in terms for, e.g., assertions of obviousness (or non-
obviousness), assertions of undoubtability (or doubtability), etc. Also, ACs and AUs 
sometimes explicitly concern the author’s own subjective state of belief (e.g., “I am certain 
that X”), but in other instances, and perhaps more commonly in legal discourse, they do so 
only implicitly. That is, ACs and AUs often explicitly reference only a purported objective 
state of the world (e.g., “X is obvious”)—omitting any direct reference to the author’s 
subjective state—while nonetheless implying that the author feels certain about X, that the 
author believes others will or should feel certain about X, etc. 
 20. See Section II.B (describing the study). For comparison with previous empirical 
studies of legal discourse, see infra note 98. 
 21. See infra page 512. 
 22. See infra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. Collectively, these findings seem to go 
against the “misguided persuasion” account. 
 25. Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, When Justices (Subconsciously) Attack: The 
Theory of Argumentative Threat and the Supreme Court, 91 OR. L. REV. 933, 933 (2013) 
[hereinafter Long & Christensen, Justices (Sub-Consciously) Attack]. 
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conventional assumptions.26 And while ideologically diverse 
panels appear to more often express uncertainty,27 ideologically 
unified panels do not appear more likely to express certainty, 
further calling into question some of the more cynical accounts of 
certainty rhetoric.28 (These and other findings are contextualized in 
section I.B, below.) 
Part I of this Article therefore ultimately concludes that the five 
conventional theories’ predictions are unsupported by the 
evidence. And while neither this Article’s arguments nor its 
empirical findings actively disprove the prevailing explanations of 
certainty rhetoric’s causes and effects, they help pave the way for a 
more realistic explanation of the continued persistence of certainty 
rhetoric—an explanation that not only better coheres with the data 
but also carries very different normative implications than the 
traditional accounts.29 
Part II supplies that new descriptive account of certainty 
rhetoric’s causes and effects—the “efficient management” 
account—and explores its normative implications. The “efficient 
management” account explains judicial certainty rhetoric as 
resulting primarily from two judicial preferences.30 First, judges 
care about their own reputation.31 This reputational concern 
constrains judges’ use of certainty rhetoric, because judges know 
they will lose credibility if they routinely overclaim (relative to the 
relevant rhetorical baseline); it also motivates judges’ selective 
admissions of uncertainty, through which judges are able to save 
face in the event other judges disagree.32 Second, judges want to 
efficiently convey useful information to their primary audiences—
other judges, lawyers, and litigants (in short, participants in the 
judicial system)—thereby effectively managing the judiciary in an 
 
 26. See infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. These findings and others appear 
to go against the “reactive escalation” account. 
 27. See Appendix Table 2. 
 28. See infra note 116 and accompanying text. These findings and others appear to go 
against the “power-grabbing” account. 
 29. See infra Sections II.C–D. 
 30. These are not judges’ only preferences (they are human, after all) but they are 
illuminating and important ones for explaining judicial certainty rhetoric. 
 31. See generally NUNO GAROUPA & TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION: A 
COMPARATIVE THEORY (2015). 
 32. See infra Section II.B.1. 
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era of expanding caseloads.33 This desire to provide various legal 
actors with useful information further motivates and constrains 
judicial certainty rhetoric.34 
The “efficient management” account of judicial certainty 
rhetoric not only helps explain its otherwise puzzling persistence, 
but also sheds light on longstanding normative debates in the 
judicial decision-making literature, including discussions of 
judicial sincerity,35 candor,36 responsiveness to litigants,37 
approaches to mounting caseloads,38 and forms of judicial 
minimalism.39 One particularly important normative insight comes 
from recent work in the burgeoning philosophical literature on 
“social epistemology.”40 Applying that field’s core insights to 
 
 33. Cf. Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 395–402 (1982) 
(characterizing various case management practices as part of “a quest for efficiency”). 
 34. See infra Section II.B.2. Lawyers’ certainty rhetoric provides an illuminating 
contrast: While repeat-player public litigants like U.S. Attorneys’ Offices may more credibly 
wield the rhetoric of certainty, most certainty rhetoric in briefs is unconstrained and therefore 
uninformative. See infra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text. Still, in terms of judicial 
decision-making, lawyers’ certainty rhetoric appears largely harmless—neither the counter-
persuasive “tell” that the conventional view describes, nor the cause of increased judicial 
certainty rhetoric. See infra notes 108-110 and accompanying text. (This is not to say that 
lawyers’ certainty rhetoric is necessarily benign: Indeed, private lawyers’ certainty rhetoric 
may sometimes send a cheap and misleading signal to clients regarding their chances of 
success on appeal, or the quality of their legal representation, reinforcing the need for candid 
feedback from judges in the form of judicial certainty rhetoric. See infra note 156 and 
accompanying text.) 
 35. See infra notes 130-140 and accompanying text (arguing, based on social 
psychology research, empirical data reported in this Article, and the independent 
plausibility of the “efficient management” account, that judicial certainty rhetoric is typically 
sincere). For an introduction to the literature on judicial sincerity and judicial candor, see 
Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987 (2008). 
 36. See infra Section II.B. On judicial candor, see Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 296 (1990). 
 37. E.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the 
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 168-82 (2005) [hereinafter Oldfather, Defining Judicial 
Inactivism]; Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational 
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 744 (2006) [hereinafter Oldfather, Remedying Judicial 
Inactivism]; see infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra Section II.B.2. For an introduction to the “caseload crisis,” see Marin K. 
Levy, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2388 (2014) (reviewing WILLIAM  M. 
RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS IN CRISIS (2013)). 
 39. See infra Section II.C. For an introduction to various forms of judicial minimalism, 
see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825 (2008). 
 40. Stein, supra note 7 (noting the paucity of legal scholarship addressing this “young 
and rapidly growing” field). For an accessible introduction, see Alvin Goldman & Thomas 
Blanchard, Social Epistemology, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY  
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ 
epistemology-social/. 
003.MACLEOD_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:54 PM 
473 Reporting Certainty 
 483 
 
judicial certainty reporting reveals certainty rhetoric’s epistemic 
utility, that is, its ability to facilitate not just efficient management, 
but also more rational and reliable belief formation, thereby 
increasing the judiciary’s tendency to arrive at legal and factual 
truths and ferret out and discard falsehood. 
While the efficient management account illuminates the many 
ways certainty rhetoric may facilitate better decision-making on the 
part of various legal actors, it leaves open the possibility that a shift 
toward greater expression of uncertainty would be worthwhile. But 
while such a rhetorical shift may indeed be salutary, it might also 
have unintended consequences for judicial decision-making—
namely, reducing judicial deliberation and altering the particular 
form of error-minimizing judicial minimalism that rhetorical 
certainty norms currently promote.41 In any event, whatever one’s 
stance on the ideal baseline level of expressed certainty versus 
uncertainty in legal discourse, this Article shows that the case 
against reporting certainty is less certain than its many proponents 
claim. Indeed, if this Article’s main thrust is correct, then judges 
ought to report their attendant degree of relative certainty—
whether it is low or, more likely, unreasonably high—more often, 
not less. 
In light of this normative suggestion, here are two brief notes of 
clarification about the Article’s scope. First, the Article doesn’t 
specify exactly how often judges ought to report their attendant 
degree of certainty, nor does it specify the degree of precision with 
which they ought to do so. One could imagine a wide range of 
possible norms or rules.42 The Article seeks to open a space for that 
 
 41. See infra Section II.C. 
 42.  A few analogies to systems with different rules and norms might help illustrate. 
National security briefings’ “words of estimative probability” such as “possibly” and 
“certainly” are sometimes stipulatively defined, within and across briefings, to pick out 
specific numerical probability ranges or point estimates—effectively forcing authors to 
quantify their confidence level even as they write in ordinary English. See Jeffrey A. 
Friedman & Richard Zeckhauser, Handling and Mishandling Estimative Probability: Likelihood, 
Confidence, and the Search for Bin Laden, 30 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SEC. 77 (2015). Intriguingly, 
some natural and artificial languages’ grammatical rules require more frequent specification 
of attendant degree of certainty than does English. See Joshua Foer, Utopian for Beginners: An 
Amateur Linguist Loses Control of the Language He Invented, NEW YORKER, Dec. 24, 2012, at 86. 
And in statistical studies, the norm of reporting p-values and confidence intervals 
accomplishes a similar task, more formally and with agreed-upon procedures for calculating 
those values. Of course, there are (interesting) ways in which analogizing to non-legal 
decision-making and language is fraught, and to be sure, the analogies aren’t meant to imply 
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imaginative enterprise; it does not generate very specific 
prescriptions regarding an ideal certainty reporting regime. 
Second, the Article doesn’t focus on the rhetoric found within the 
handful of headline-generating split constitutional opinions the 
Supreme Court publishes.43 The causes, effects, and normative 
implications of those decisions’ certainty rhetoric might well differ 
from the intermediate appellate court decisions on which this 
Article focuses.44 
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Section I.A surveys 
the five explanations of when and why certainty rhetoric appears 
in judicial opinions and briefs. After articulating each theory, it 
notes the empirical predictions the theory generates, along with the 
theory’s main normative implications. Section I.B examines reasons 
to doubt each theory, briefly scrutinizing their intuitive plausibility, 
then reporting new empirical evidence from the dataset described 
above. Part II articulates and defends the new “efficient 
management” account of judicial certainty rhetoric, focusing on the 
account’s descriptive plausibility, noting how it better coheres with 
the empirical data, and examining its normative implications. Part 
III considers some of the present study’s limitations and concludes. 
I. PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS AND REASONS FOR SKEPTICISM 
A. Five Explanatory Proposals and Their Implications 
This section surveys potential explanations of the causes45 and 
effects of certainty rhetoric in opinions and, to a lesser extent, 
briefs.46 After describing each theory, I briefly articulate relevant 
 
that judges ought to attempt to quantify the confidence level that attends each of their 
assertions. But at the very least, imagining alternative certainty reporting regimes can shed 
light on the assumptions and values that underlie current practices. 
 43.  See infra note 94. 
 44.  See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 45. One tempting “explanation” won’t do—namely, positing that that lawyers and 
judges use certainty rhetoric because there is a “norm” of using certainty rhetoric. That only 
pushes the question back further: Why did the norm develop? 
 46. These theories represent simplified, broad explanations, not exhaustive catalogues 
of all the possible reasons a given author might use a given AC or AU in a given opinion. 
Moreover, the theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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empirical predictions the theory generates, followed by the theory’s 
main normative implications.47 
1. Certainty rhetoric as misguided persuasion 
One prominent explanation for judges’ (and lawyers’) certainty 
rhetoric is that they mistakenly think it’s persuasive. Lawyers draft 
briefs with near single-minded focus on persuading judges, and 
judges—perhaps just as much as lawyers—want to persuade other 
judges, whether those judges are on the same panel, on the same 
court, in another circuit, or in a higher reviewing court.48 As we’ve 
 
 47. These normative implications relate primarily to judicial behavior, rather than 
litigant behavior, for two reasons. First, the literature contains far less normative theorizing 
about litigant behavior than about judicial behavior. Second, and relatedly, the litigant’s task 
in writing a brief is more straightforward than the judge’s task in writing an opinion. A brief 
succeeds if it persuades the judge in the case at hand. That may be an over-simplification, 
but no matter how nuanced one’s account of the purposes of a brief, the criteria for a 
successful judicial opinion are more numerous and more disputed: Should its focus be 
persuading the parties to the dispute? Persuading some other audience? Providing guidance 
for other courts? Facilitating efficient appellate review? Creating narrow precedent? Broad 
precedent? Etc. 
  None of this should imply that the study of briefs is unimportant. To the contrary, 
the development of the law depends in large part on the quality of briefing. Hence judges’ 
hesitance to decide issues not briefed and to base decisions on arguments not made by the 
litigants. See Scott A. Moss, Bad Briefs, Bad Law, Bad Markets: Documenting the Poor Quality of 
Plaintiffs’ Briefs, Its Impact on the Law, and the Market Failure It Reflects, 63 EMORY L.J. 59, 65 
(2013) (“[B]ad briefs impact judicial reasoning, skewing the caselaw”). For better or worse, 
American appellate judges—at the Supreme Court level, but much more so at the circuit 
court level, where caseloads are much higher and resources more constrained—depend on 
appellate legal briefs that clearly and thoroughly articulate the best arguments for and 
against a given outcome. Cf. Levy, supra note 38. In any event, if litigant certainty rhetoric 
causes judicial certainty rhetoric, see infra Section I.B,  then those ultimately interested only 
in judicial certainty rhetoric should still be concerned about litigant certainty rhetoric. 
 48. See, e.g., Gluck & Posner, supra note 9, at 13 (emphasizing the importance judges 
place on writing opinions that are persuasive to colleagues, as revealed in interviews with 
forty-two active federal appellate judges); Alan B. Handler, A Matter of Opinion, 15 RUTGERS 
L.J. 1, 2 (1983); Michael J. Higdon, Something Judicious This Way Comes, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1213, 1242 (2010) (“Writing opinions is a lot like writing briefs. Both are, at bottom, efforts to 
persuade. Lawyers want to satisfy clients and win cases. Judges want to persuade lawyers, 
litigants, the community at large that the decision they have made . . . is the absolutely 
correct one.” (quoting Judith S. Kaye, Judges as Wordsmiths, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 10, 
10)); Robert A. Leflar, Quality in Judicial Opinions, 3 PACE L. REV. 579, 584 (1983) (“The 
opinion . . . is an essay in persuasion. The value of the opinion is measured by its ability to 
induce the audience to accept the judgment.” (quoting James D. Hopkins, Notes on Style in 
Judicial Opinions, 8 TRIAL JUDGES’ J. 49, 50 (1969))); Wetlaufer, supra note 2 at 1561 (“[O]nce 
the judge has decided the case before her, she may assume a role as advocate that is in certain 
respects indistinguishable from the role that was played by the lawyers who argued the case. 
As was earlier true of the lawyers-with-clients, she has a position to defend.”(footnote 
omitted)); cf. Irving Younger, Symptoms of Bad Writing, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1986, at 113, reprinted 
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seen, all commentators appear to agree that assertions of certainty 
are unpersuasive and signal weak arguments.49 So the  
“misguided persuasion” account’s primary empirical predictions 
are that the best lawyers and judges avoid unnecessary certainty 
assertions, that parties using more of them lose more often, and  
that judicial opinions employing more of them are less influential 
(at least outside their circuit, where they represent merely 
persuasive authority). 
As for its normative implications, the “misguided persuasion” 
account paints a grim picture of certainty rhetoric and of a judicial 
system that resorts to it as often as ours. If it is desirable that judges 
attempt to persuade, as many think it is,50 it is disconcerting that 
they are using such a counter-productive method.51 And if, as many 
commentators claim, certainty rhetoric signals its opposite—that is, 
if it signals weakness of argument rather than strength—then it 
represents a particularly embarrassing form of unpersuasiveness: 
it provides easily observable examples of judges making false 
statements (e.g., that X is “obvious” where X is actually non-
 
in MICH. B.J., Mar. 2003, at 44, 44 (2003) (addressing the “solemn overstatement that many 
lawyers seem to think is the way to argue a case”). Granted, judges are not the only audience 
for briefs and opinions. The readers of briefs include opposing counsel and litigants (whose 
thoughts matter for settlement purposes), and sometimes the media. The readers of opinions 
may include the parties, other potential parties in future cases, lawyers in future cases, 
academics, media, politicians (especially where judges have opportunities for promotion), 
and the public (especially where judges are elected). 
 49. See, e.g., supra notes 8–10. 
 50. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING § 10.1, at 118 (3d ed. 2012) (stating 
that a judicial opinion’s purpose is “to convince any reader that sound logic supports the 
court’s decision”); JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 280 (5th ed. 2007) 
(“[Good appellate opinions are] written essay[s] consciously designed to persuade the 
audience that the result is correct.”). That said, commentators differ as to how central a goal 
or concern persuasiveness should be, and all seem to agree that judges should avoid 
“advocacy”-a term with a murky meaning in this context, but one that is related to the 
attempt to persuade. See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 8, at 19 (explaining, under the 
heading “Avoiding advocacy[,]” that “[a]n opinion can—and properly should—carry 
conviction”); Moses Lasky, A Return to the Observatory Below the Bench, 19 SW. L.J. 679, 688–
89 (1965) (“[Some] opinion[s] read[] like a lawyer’s brief, the worst possible style for a judicial 
opinion. It discloses this kind of judge for what he is and ought not be, an advocate.”); id. 
(explaining that “dissenting judge[s] should state the points of disagreement forcefully and 
effectively without engaging in argument or advocacy”). 
 51. See Gibson, supra note 8; Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial 
Decision Making, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 709 (2011); Wanderer, supra note 8; supra notes 
8-10 and accompanying text. 
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obvious).52 Finally, to the extent judges mistakenly think certainty 
rhetoric can effectively paper over flaws in their arguments, its 
availability and acceptability may create bad ex ante incentives. 
Specifically, if the author thinks she can accomplish through 
emphatic assertion the same degree of persuasiveness that might 
otherwise have required additional scrutiny and written analysis, 
she might be less likely to undertake that analysis in the first place. 
She might thus fail to closely scrutinize the propositions for which 
persuasive justification is most difficult to find or to articulate—
likely the most dubious propositions on which the decision rests. 
The result may be less considered, more error-prone opinions than 
would come about absent certainty rhetoric. 
2. Certainty rhetoric as reactive escalation 
A second account explains certainty rhetoric as a more or less 
impulsive reaction to others’ rhetorical provocation—the sort of 
thing that happens in contentious verbal disputes.53 Applied to 
judicial opinions, the reactive escalation account has three variants. 
First, judicial assertions of certainty might result from, and 
positively correlate with, the losing brief’s use of certainty rhetoric, 
as the authoring judge reacts to incorrect and overblown statements 
with her own responsive bluster.54 Alternatively, judicial opinions’ 
certainty rhetoric might result from, and positively correlate with, 
the winning brief’s use of certainty rhetoric (perhaps “parroting” 
the winning side’s language).55 And finally, in cases of split panel 
 
 52. Note, though, that the misguided persuasion account allows that certainty rhetoric 
could be sincere or insincere. See Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing,  
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 286 (2008) (“Honesty and [p]ersuasiveness [need not be] 
mutually exclusive.”). 
 53. See Long & Christensen, Justices (Sub-Consciously) Attack,  supra note 25, at 935 
(arguing that the rhetoric in Supreme Court dissents and losing briefs is symptomatic of a 
subconscious reactive impulse that stems from a perception of being threatened). 
 54. Note that the “escalation” here need not mean employing greater certainty 
rhetoric than the source to which it is reacting. The theory does not predict that judicial opinions 
will use more certainty rhetoric than the briefs, for instance, but instead that a brief’s greater-
than-average certainty rhetoric will bring about a judicial opinion with greater than average 
certainty rhetoric. 
 55. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE LITTLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM 21–22 (2007) (noting that 
judges “sometimes insert into their opinions, without attribution, verbatim passages from 
lawyers’ briefs”); Moses Lasky, Observing Appellate Opinions from Below the Bench, 49 CALIF. 
L. REV. 831, 831–32 (1961) (same); Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 1562 (“In [writing a judicial 
opinion], of course, the judge is repeating and perhaps improving upon the rhetorical moves 
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opinions, judges authoring majority opinions or dissents might 
react to what they consider overblown rhetoric in the other opinion, 
resulting in greater use of certainty rhetoric, and fewer statements 
of uncertainty, in split opinions.56 
As a normative matter, the reactive escalation account gives 
little to be happy about. Granted, some scholars emphasize the 
importance of judicial responsiveness to litigants as a check on 
judicial inaction, and might be happy if it turned out that judges 
pay such close attention to the briefs while crafting their opinions.57 
But many would worry that such responsiveness is symptomatic of 
myopic decision-making or undesirable advocacy in opinion 
writing, evincing too much focus on arguing with the parties to the 
dispute and not enough on the careful wording of precedent.58 And 
where panels are split, certainty rhetoric as reactive escalation 
might give rise to embarrassing and legitimacy-reducing rhetorical 
arms races between judges on the same panel,59 with each judge 
becoming more and more entrenched and claiming greater and 
greater certainty in response to the sort of peer disagreement that 
 
that have already once been made by the winning lawyer in his now-successful arguments 
to the judge.” (emphasis omitted)); cf. Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 
CALIF. L. REV. 699, 737–38 (2013). For related research on the extent to which different 
Supreme Court justices use language from the briefs, see Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al., The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
917 (2015); Adam Feldman, A Brief Assessment of Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1946–2013, 
86 MISS. L.J. 105 (2017). 
 56. See, e.g., Long & Christensen, Justices (Sub-Consciously) Attack, supra note 25. 
 57. See Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism, supra note 37, at 744; Oldfather, 
Defining Judicial Inactivism, supra note 37, at 168-82. For studies of judicial responsiveness 
more generally, see Chad M. Oldfather et al., Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness: Automated 
Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1189 
(2012); Pamela C. Corley et al., Lower Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 
73 J. POL. 31 (2011); Pamela C. Corley, The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: The Influence of 
Parties’ Briefs, 61 POL. RES. Q. 468 (2008). 
 58. See Holmes v. Rogers, 13 Cal. 191, 202 (1859) (petition for rehearing) (“An opinion 
is not . . . a brief in reply to the counsel against whose views we decide.”); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
supra note 8, at 19 (explaining, under the heading “Avoiding advocacy[,]” that “an opinion 
should not become an argument between the judge and the lawyers”). On the importance of 
precise wording in judicial opinions, see Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1254-55 (2007) (“[O]ne good quote is worth a hundred clever 
analyses of the holding.” (quoting Fredrick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 
683 (1986) (book review))); id. at 1255 (“[T]he opinion’s language ‘will be carefully analyzed, 
and discussions of why one word rather than another was used will be common.’” (quoting 
Schauer, supra)); see also Charles W. Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 
1988 WIS. L. REV. 771, 813-14. 
 59. See Long & Christensen, Justices (Sub-Consciously) Attack, supra note 25. 
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ought rationally to spur greater uncertainty.60 In short, as with the 
misguided persuasion account, the reactive escalation account 
raises concerns about judicial opinion-writing practices and gives 
reason to promote the avoidance of certainty rhetoric in both briefs 
and opinions. 
3. Certainty rhetoric as extralegal communication style 
Another possibility is that certainty rhetoric in legal opinions 
(and perhaps also briefs) is merely bleed over from the author’s 
style of writing and speaking in other, extralegal contexts. The 
author’s expressions of certainty or uncertainty merely reflect the 
communication style—assertive or tentative—that he or she 
employs in everyday life. This theory generates relevant empirical 
predictions by drawing from empirical research on gender, race, 
and assertive versus tentative communication styles. Specifically, 
that research indicates that women and racial minorities in 
contemporary America tend on average to use relatively tentative 
language compared to men and whites.61 If ACs and AUs in legal 
opinions are simply manifestations of the same assertive or 
tentative communication styles people exhibit in other domains, 
then AUs should be more prevalent in opinions written by women 
and by nonwhites, while ACs should be more prevalent in opinions 
written by men and by whites. 
As for the normative implications of this account, it’s difficult 
to assess them without knowing more about the impact such 
rhetoric actually has on the audiences for judicial opinions. If 
audiences take such rhetoric at face value, then on this account 
opinions written by whites and males could have outsize influence, 
perhaps obtaining more citations or creating more expansive legal 
 
 60.  Cf. Stein, supra note 7; infra Section II.D.  
 61. See ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN’S PLACE (1975); Faye 
Crosby & Linda Nyquist, The Female Register: An Empirical Study of Lakoff’s Hypotheses, 6 
LANGUAGE SOC’Y 313 (1977); Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ 
Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y. & LAW 133, 149 (2010); Rachael K. 
Hinkle et al., A Positive Theory and Empirical Analysis of Strategic Word Choice in District Court 
Opinions, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 407, 432 (2012) (finding that “women and African-Americans 
use[d] more hedges”); Lawrence A. Hosman & Susan A. Siltanen, Powerful and Powerless 
Language Forms: Their Consequences for Impression Formation, Attributions of Control of Self and 
Control of Others, Cognitive Responses, and Message Memory, 25 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
33 (2006); Campbell Leaper & Rachel D. Robnett, Women Are More Likely Than Men to Use 
Tentative Language, Aren’t They? A Meta-Analysis Testing for Gender Differences and Moderators, 
35 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 129 (2011). 
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rules than opinions written by nonwhites and females.62 On the 
other hand, if audiences treat ACs as signaling weakness of 
argument63 (and perhaps even AUs as signaling more critical 
thinking),64 then maybe the outsize influence goes to traditionally 
underrepresented authors. But even then, the increased influence 
would still be unprincipled, resulting as it would from mere 
differences in general communication styles, rather than actual 
differences in attendant certainty. In short, legal certainty rhetoric 
as bleed over from extralegal communication styles would make 
such rhetoric at best normatively neutral, and quite possibly 
normatively undesirable. 
4. Certainty rhetoric as power-grabbing 
Unlike the “reactive escalation” and “extralegal communication 
style” theories, the “power-grabbing” theory posits a more strategic 
and forward-looking purpose behind judges’ use of certainty 
rhetoric. According to this account, judges use the language of 
certainty as a tool for pushing legal doctrine further in their favored 
direction than it would otherwise go. If, for example, an opinion 
states that, given what police officers knew at the time of a search, 
they “certainly” had probable cause, the opinion may articulate a 
more expansive probable cause holding than it would have if the 
word “certainly” had not been used. Additionally, lawyers seeking 
to defend officers’ searches may cite the opinion’s certainty 
language more readily than they would cite an opinion that is silent 
as to attendant degree of certainty.65 On this view, ideologically 
 
 62. See sources cited infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
 63. See sources cited supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Cross & Pennebaker, supra note 16, at 873 (“One study of students found that 
tentativeness was associated with greater critical thinking, while certainty was associated 
with lesser critical thinking.”) (citing Monica Metrick Kennison, The Evaluation of Critical 
Thinking, Reflective Writing, and Cognitive Word Use in Baccalaureate Nursing Students (2003) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University) (on file with West Virginia 
University Scholar Institutional Repository)). 
 65. From the dataset described in Section I.B.2 below, see, for example, United States 
v. Whitaker, 546 F.3d 902, 911 (7th Cir. 2008) stating,  
  “The information obtained by the police after their arrival at the scene . . . 
certainly gave the officers the requisite authority to search the cabin of Mr. 
Whitaker’s car . . . . All of these factors, when assessed in their totality, certainly 
constituted a sufficient basis to justify the officers’ inspection of the cabin for a 
weapon.”  
(emphases added). 
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unified panels would be more likely than other panels to use 
certainty rhetoric.66 Additionally, opinions with more certainty 
statements would garner more citations per page both inside and 
outside of the circuit (because they have created a more expansive 
rule, because they provide especially useful sound bites, or both). 
As a normative matter, those who advocate judicial minimalism 
and worry about overreliance on dicta will likely find the “power-
grabbing” account distressing.67 That said, as dicta goes, this might 
be a less troubling kind than some: adding the word “obviously” 
does not require the sort of far-flung diversion that commentators 
worry wastes judicial resources, ventures into territory not 
sufficiently briefed by the parties, or creates merely advisory 
opinions. In other words, the same quality that makes certainty 
rhetoric an especially tempting form of dictum may make it 
relatively benign in terms of the institutional competence, role, and 
resource allocation concerns that motivate some commentators’ 
aversion to dicta.68 
5. Certainty rhetoric as legitimacy bolstering 
A final possible explanation for judicial certainty rhetoric is that 
judges claim certainty because they think that doing so promotes 
or helps sustain the judiciary’s legitimacy.69 In other words, judges 
 
 66. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and 
American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2014) (addressing the “attitudinal model” of 
judicial decision-making in political science literature, where “attitude” is often measured 
using political party of appointing president) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR 
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013)).  
 67. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7-9, 15 (1996) (discussing benefits of judicial minimalism). 
 68. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 
(2005); Michael Gentithes, Check the Invitation: The Trouble with Appeals Invited by Supreme 
Court Justices, 82 MO. L. REV. 339 (2017). 
 69. See, e.g., Gerwitz, supra note 7 (“[T]he rhetoric of certainty seems to result from the 
perceived need of judges to preserve the institutional authority of the court.”); Anne E. 
Mullins, Subtly Selling the System: Where Psychological Influence Tactics Lurk in Judicial Writing, 
48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111 (2014). I focus here on institutional, rather than individual, 
reputation—i.e., on the perceived ability of judges, exercising the judicial craft, to arrive at 
clearly correct answers, rather than on the individual judge’s extraordinary ability, compared 
to other judges, to arrive at clearly correct answers. Cf. Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive 
Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1071–72 (positing that private adjudicators 
may stress their confidence in order to signal to potential customers superior capability). 
Privately employed lawyers are in this respect more like private adjudicators than they are 
like unelected federal judges: private lawyers must impress a lay audience to attract and 
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use certainty rhetoric to convey to readers the impression that the 
litigation process and exercise of judicial craft result in conclusions 
that are unavoidable and clearly correct.70 On this account, one 
might predict that certainty assertions appear less frequently in 
opinions concerning areas of law where the judiciary’s legitimacy 
is less at issue—for example, less in commercial contract disputes 
than in, say, search and seizure cases (where courts use notoriously 
slippery balancing tests to justify the state’s use of coercive force).71 
This account would also predict that dissenting opinions will 
refrain from asserting certainty, lest the court’s majority opinion be 
undermined, while the majority opinion will employ greater-than-
average AC usage (and lower-than-average AU usage) in order to 
affirm, in the face of dissent, that the court’s conclusions are 
unavoidable and clearly correct. 
Normatively, there’s nothing inherently wrong with a judiciary 
that wants to enhance its institutional reputation or legitimacy, but 
most commentators worry that certainty rhetoric is a bad way to go 
about it. First, if certainty rhetoric is as unpersuasive and 
embarrassing as the literature suggests, then it may be 
counterproductive as a means to bolster the judiciary’s legitimacy.72 
Second, even assuming that certainty rhetoric actually does 
produce an increase in apparent legitimacy, it might nonetheless be 
undesirable insofar as the appearance of legitimacy is the product 
 
keep customers. (In this vein, it would be interesting to study whether elected judges express 
greater certainty in their opinions leading up to re-election. Cf. Michael J. Nelson, Elections 
and Explanations: Judicial Retention and the Readability of Judicial Opinions (Nov. 18, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (online at http://mjnelson.org/papers/NelsonReadability. 
pdf) (finding that elected judges produce more “readable” opinions directly  
preceding reelection).) 
 70. At the appellate level, facts are treated as settled. I therefore focus here primarily 
on the need to convey legal determinacy and accuracy of legal conclusions. Much of the 
literature on judicial behavior and legal theory focuses on the judiciary’s need to convey to 
the public the determinacy of law, neglecting the judiciary’s role in conveying to the public 
that facts have been determined accurately and with a high degree of warranted confidence. 
But both are probably important for perceived legitimacy. 
 71. Cf. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as 
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 112 n.127 (1988) (“These [Fourth Amendment] balancing 
opinions are radically underwritten: interests are identified and a winner is proclaimed or a 
rule is announced . . . . Of course, the hidden process raises the specter of the kind of judicial 
decisionmaking that the Realists warned us about and that balancing promised to 
overcome.”) (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 976 (1987)). On the ideological divisiveness of Fourth Amendment law, see 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? (2006); and Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, 
Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 261 (1996). 
 72. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
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of insincere or otherwise misleading assurances (e.g., that X is 
obvious, where it actually is not).73 Finally, if judges come to 
“[b]elieve [t]heir [o]wn [h]ype,”74 they might misapprehend the 
scope or extent of their institutional legitimacy or expertise. That 
could result in a greater tendency to, for example, write expansive 
opinions or defer less to other branches than would exist if judges 
maintained a more sober appraisal of the degree to which their 
certainty is warranted. 
B. Reasons to Doubt the Explanatory Proposals 
The previous section surveyed five potential accounts of the 
causes, effects, and normative implications of litigant and judicial 
certainty rhetoric. This section provides reasons to doubt each. 
Section II.A briefly explores some questionable aspects of each 
account as a matter of intuitive plausibility. Section II.B reports the 
results of an empirical examination of certainty and uncertainty 
expressions in appellate briefs and appellate opinions, noting 
various inconsistencies between the empirical data and the 
predictions generated by each of the accounts. 
1. Intuitive plausibility 
Before getting to the empirical data, it is worth noting a few 
preliminary reasons to doubt the explanatory proposals surveyed 
above. First, the “misguided persuasion” account gives 
implausibly little credit to judges (as well as lawyers). After all, 
everybody who has addressed the subject—including judges 
themselves—claims that judges find assertions of certainty 
 
 73. Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563 
(2012); Simon, Psychological Model, supra note 2, at 141 (“[J]udges and their audiences must 
become comfortable with the wielding of power by this non-majoritarian institution through 
decisions devoid of putative certainty.”). The mismatch between the appearance and the 
reality of legal certainty (and, consequently, judicial legitimacy) could be problematic on 
deontological or consequentialist grounds. William Popkin provides an interesting take on 
the latter. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL AND 
INDIVIDUAL STYLES 173 (2007). He argues that the “traditional use of an authoritative tone” 
poses a danger to the judicial system not because “the general public will pay much attention 
to the way judges write opinions,” but because “the greatest risk to judging comes from 
cynicism bred within the legal profession,” and the traditional tone represents “a 
consistently fictional style of presenting judicial opinions [that] can erode professional 
confidence in judging,” breeding intraprofessional cynicism. Id. 
 74. See Zev J. Elgen and Yair Listoken, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype, and 
Should They? A Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239 (2012). 
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unpersuasive and even counter-persuasive, that is, signals of 
“weakness” and “lack of logical proof”—in short, “exactly [the] 
opposite [of] their original meaning.”75 Could the lawyers and 
judges using certainty rhetoric really be so clueless? We should at 
least hesitate and examine alternative hypotheses before 
concluding that they are, especially if (as the data reported in the 
next Part indicate) seemingly high-quality lawyers and judges are 
no less apt to use it. 
The second, “reactive escalation,” and third, “extralegal 
communication style,” accounts, while both somewhat plausible, 
also give suspiciously little credit to the authors of briefs and 
opinions. For example, the “reactive escalation” account relies on 
analogizing arguments made in appellate briefs and opinions to the 
sorts of quick, knee-jerk rhetorical defensiveness linguists have 
observed in extemporaneous verbal responses.76 But these writings 
(especially precedential judicial opinions) are not knee-jerk 
rhetorical reactions; they are carefully considered texts whose 
words, one might expect, were chosen deliberately as the result of 
some conscious decision. The “extralegal communication style” 
account is subject to similar concerns. 
The fourth, “power-grabbing,” account would cohere with 
substantial political science literature concerning judicial 
preferences and political ideology.77 But it may fail to explain the 
ACs that appear in the run-of-the-mill cases that comprise a large 
portion of courts’ dockets. In such cases, judges may have no 
ideological preference one way or another, let alone a preference 
for an expansive rule that reaches beyond the facts of the case. To 
the extent that certainty rhetoric appears in such cases, it may be 
hard to conceive of it as an attempt to grab outsize influence for the 
sake of accomplishing some policy preference the panel 
supposedly shares. 
The fifth, “legitimacy bolstering,” account may help explain 
how baseline stylistic norms developed in the first place. But it fails 
 
 75. See supra notes 5–10 and accompanying text. 
 76. The reactive escalation account also suffers from a further problem: It does not 
explain why anybody would be the first to unnecessarily assert certainty in any given 
appellate case. 
 77. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Frank B. Cross & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition 
and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 421 (2007). 
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to grapple with the fact that, in the mine-run of cases (even 
published appellate cases), judges cannot expect their opinion to 
affect institutional legitimacy; they cannot expect an audience for 
their opinion beyond a small set of highly informed observers—
namely, judges and lawyers whose impression of the judiciary’s 
legitimacy is unlikely to be influenced by such rhetoric (let alone 
favorably influenced). Moreover, given the seemingly universal 
disdain for certainty rhetoric amongst the primary audiences of 
most judicial opinions (judges, lawyers, and legal commentators), 
one might predict that individual judges would free-ride on others’ 
certainty rhetoric. That is, each individual judge would leave  
to other judges the task of bolstering institutional legitimacy in  
this embarrassing way, with the result that certainty rhetoric  
would be eliminated absent some (currently nonexistent) 
coordination mechanism. 
Finally, as a general matter, it is also worth noting that most of 
the explanatory hypotheses cannot account for statements of 
uncertainty. Indeed, four of the five accounts arguably render 
somewhat bizarre the practice of even occasionally reporting 
uncertainty.78 According to the “misguided strategic persuasion” 
account, authors would think AUs unpersuasive and hence not use 
them. The “reactive escalation” theory posits a one-way ratchet 
favoring increasing certainty with no concomitant account of how 
uncertainty would enter the mix. The “power-grabbing” and 
“legitimacy bolstering” accounts likewise render AUs somewhat 
mysterious, if not inexplicable.79 One might respond by positing 
that AUs are better explained by some account unrelated to that 
which explains ACs. Indeed, most commentators addressing 
certainty rhetoric say little or nothing about assertions of 
 
 78. The extralegal communication style account does not run into this problem. 
 79. The “power-grabbing” account might most naturally accommodate uncertainty 
statements. Under a modified version of that account, AUs could be used by ideologically 
unified panel authors to intentionally diminish the scope or influence of a decision with 
which they disagree or dislike but feel bound to adopt due to legal constraints. Cf. Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2014) (reviewing LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: 
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013)). Additionally, in 
ideologically diverse panels, minority-ideology judges could join the majority on the (explicit 
or implicit) condition that the opinion’s scope and impact be limited (including through use 
of AUs). This latter modified “power-grabbing” account for ideologically divided panels 
might find some corroboration in the empirical data, which showed ideologically diverse 
panels using AUs more frequently. See Appendix Table 2. 
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uncertainty. But ACs and AUs seem sufficiently related that, at the 
very least, an explanation of one should not render the other more 
mysterious, let alone inexplicable. And the literature’s failure to 
consider uncertainty statements seems sometimes to render its 
arguments suspect, as when some suggest that dissenting judges 
behave according to a reactive escalation model, without 
considering whether dissenting opinions show a concomitant 
increase in assertions of uncertainty (which, at least in the dataset 
described below, they do).80 Ideally, a theory could fit and explain 
expressions of both certainty and uncertainty. 
2. Empirical evidence 
This section reports a body of original empirical evidence that 
sheds light on the five theories articulated in Part I. Section II.B.1 
describes the dataset, variables coded, and statistical models used 
to analyze the data; sections II.B.2–3 report the study’s specific 
findings, touching on the five theories’ empirical predictions along 
the way; and section II.B.4 provides a more general overview and 
discussion of how the theories fare in light of the data.81 
 a. The dataset, variables, and statistical models. The dataset con-
tains 428 cases (483 opinions, counting majority opinions, concur-
rences, and dissents separately) published in 2007 and 2008 in the 
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, along with 
the 344 appellate briefs submitted in 121 of those cases. 
For each case, I coded (1) subject matter attributes, (2) judicial 
opinion attributes, and (3) judge and panel attributes. For subject 
matter, the cases were in three categories: Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure; commercial contract disputes presenting at 
least one civil procedure issue; and combination criminal/civil 
cases presenting at least one civil procedure issue.82 For judicial 
opinion attributes, I coded outcome, that is, appellant win or loss;83 
 
 80. See Long & Christensen, Justices (Sub-Consciously) Attack, supra note 25. 
 81. The original data is available upon request. 
 82. See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 83. As is common, I coded both complete and partial appellant wins (e.g., “affirmed 
in part and reversed in part”) as appellant wins, and all else as appellant losses. See, e.g., 
Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts Redux? An Empirical Study 
of State Court Trials on Appeal, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 100, 115 n.72 (2015) (explaining and 
employing the same approach); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, “Too Many Notes”? An 
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rate of AC and AU use per 10,000 words;84 whether the opinion was 
written by a majority, a majority in the presence of dissent, or a 
dissenter;85 and number of subsequent case citations to the opinion 
inside and outside of the circuit.86 And for judge and panel attributes, 
I coded authoring judge’s gender, race, and law school attended;87 
and ideological unity or disunity of the panel.88 For each 
corresponding appellate brief, I coded (1) subject matter attributes 
(same three subjects described above); (2) brief attributes (rate of AC 
and AU use per 10,000 words); and (3) litigant and legal 
representation attributes (appellee or appellant; represented by 
federal government, top-ranked law firm,89 or other). A table in the 
Appendix shows the total number of each of these variables.90 
Before describing how two of the key variables, ACs and AUs, 
were coded, a brief explanation of case selection is in order. I chose 
three circuits in order to facilitate across-circuit comparison.91 I 
chose the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits because they are 
geographically diverse, well-respected, and likely to have a cross 
section of legal representation types (including top-ranked law 
firms). I chose the years 2007–2008 because they were recent 
enough to reflect current practice, but not so recent that they would 
fail to reflect significant divergences in the number of citations an 
opinion receives after its publication. For case subject matter, I 
relied on Westlaw’s keynote categorization system. I chose three 
 
Empirical Study of Advocacy in Federal Appeals, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 578, 582  
(2015) (same). 
 84. See infra text accompanying note 101. 
 85. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part were coded as dissents. 
 86. Count data was obtained via LexisNexis as of January 2012. 
 87. Following Sisk, Heise, and Moriss’s categorization, which they based on 
numerous ranking sources such as U.S. News and World Reports, rankings of faculty 
publication rates, and other sources, Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the 
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998), a juris 
doctorate degree from one of the following schools counted as “elite”: Chicago, Columbia, 
Harvard, Michigan, Stanford, Virginia, and Yale. Judge gender and race were obtained via 
the Auburn dataset, online at http://www.wmich.edu/nsf-coa/, and the Federal Judicial 
Center’s biographical directory, online at http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj. Per 
curiam opinions were not included in analyses concerning authoring judge characteristics. 
 88. Each judge was coded as either Republican or Democrat based on their appointing 
president’s party. 
 89. A “top ranked law firm” was defined as any firm listed on Vault’s top-twenty 
firms of 2008 in Texas (for the 5th Circuit), Chicago (for the 7th Circuit), and California (for 
the 9th Circuit). 
 90. See Appendix Table 1. 
 91. In the end, the data did not reveal significant differences across the circuits as to 
the questions addressed in this study. 
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subject matter areas to facilitate across-subject-matter comparison, 
particularly across the criminal-public/civil-private law divide, 
which would facilitate comparison of different types of legal 
representation and different degrees of ideological salience. 
Specifically, on the criminal side, I chose Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure cases because Fourth Amendment law is 
notoriously ideologically divisive and standard-based, and might 
therefore shed light on the impact of ideology and institutional 
legitimacy concerns.92 As a contrasting set of cases on the civil side 
involving less ideologically salient issues, I chose commercial 
contract disputes raising an issue of civil procedure. Finally, I chose 
cases presenting part criminal, part civil-procedural issues as a 
middle ground.93 The 428 cases in the dataset represent all of the 
published cases that fit the circuit, time, and subject matter criteria 
just described.94 The 344 briefs in the dataset represent all of the 
corresponding briefs submitted in the Fourth Amendment and the 
commercial contract/civil procedure subject matter categories (the 
 
 92. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 93. These cases concerned a more diverse set of substantive legal issues than the other 
two categories. They include, e.g., cases concerning habeas corpus, RICO, False Claims Act, 
antitrust violations, contempt of court, and civil rights claims. 
 94. The dataset is thus comprised of appellate cases generally, not just those that are 
most difficult, however that might be assessed. Cf. Keith Carlson et al., supra note 16 (noting 
that qualitative “analysis of style tends to focus on the gems in judicial writing, . . . neglecting 
the mine-run of workaday opinions”); Gluck & Posner, supra note 9, at 1306 (“We . . . share 
a strong belief in the merits of turning more scholarly attention away from the Supreme 
Court and instead to the everyday decisionmakers in the system[, especially intermediate 
appellate judges].”); id. at n.20 (citing “a few exceptions to the myopic focus on the [Supreme] 
Court”); Michael A. Livermore et al., The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 
837 (2017); Sutton, supra note 11, at 872 (“[I]n assessing the influences on judicial behavior, 
there is much to be learned from considering how judges resolve the run-of-the-mine cases, 
not the hardest ones.”). That said, given the high rate of cases decided via unpublished 
summary disposition, the fact that a case results in a published opinion provides some 
evidence that the issues it addresses are relatively novel or difficult. See Morgan L. W. 
Hazelton et al., Sound the Alarm? Judicial Decisions Regarding Publication and Dissent, 44 AM. 
POL. RES. 649 (2016) (finding that nearly sixty percent of the U.S. Courts of Appeals cases 
from 2005 to 2008 which cite the Fourth Amendment were unpublished); Michael Kagan et 
al., Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO L.J. 683, 684 (2018) (“Nearly 
90% of decisions in federal courts of appeals are now designated ‘unpublished.’ The rates 
vary considerably by circuit, however, with the most extreme circuit publishing less than 
4%.”); David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1801 (2009) (reviewing 
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)); Norman R. Williams, The Failings of 
Originalism: The Federal Courts and Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 762 (2004) 
(“[T]he published written opinion—the hallmark of American appellate justice—is now the 
exception rather than the rule.”). 
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two categories with the greatest variety of legal representation 
types) that were available on Westlaw.95 
Now, on to an explanation of how ACs and AUs were coded. 
The following terms were, depending on the context in which they 
appeared, coded as ACs and AUs: 
ACs: clear*96, obvious*, certain*, undoubted*, doubt*, 
unquestionabl*, “no* serious*”, indisputabl*, “not dispute*”, eas*, 
inarguabl*, simpl*, spurious, dishonest*, utter*, fathom*, 
unfathom*, comprehen*, incomprehensibl*, conceive*, 
inconceivabl*, “straight face”, (one /2 conclusion), sure*, imagin*, 
confident*, “well-established”, “of course”, [negated AUs such as 
“not difficult*”] 
AUs: difficult*, admit*, sincere*, respect*, uncertain*, unclear*, 
arguabl*, grant*, hard, debate*, “to be sure”, complicated, 
[negated ACs such as “not obvious*”] 
In manually coding the opinions and briefs, context played a 
crucial role in excluding some instances in which the above terms 
were used. For example, terms that would otherwise count as ACs 
did not count where they were used in legal doctrinal phrases such 
as “clear error,” or “beyond a reasonable doubt,” nor where they 
were invoked in a direct application of those doctrinal phrases.97 
And a term listed above as an AC would not be coded as an AC 
where it was used as part of a quote not endorsed by the author. 
Similarly, “simply” was not coded as an AC where it could be 
substituted for “merely,” nor was “of course” where it could be 
substituted for “granted,” as used when conceding something. 
Context was also key in determining when terms like “imagin*”or 
“comprehen*” constituted the author’s own ACs, rather than a 
description of somebody else’s viewpoint (e.g., in the phrase “We 
cannot imagine a worse reason,” which would count as including 
 
 95. For cases with cross-appeals, briefs were coded only for one party on each side of 
the litigation (the first listed party whose briefs were available on Westlaw). 
 96. “*” symbolizes a “root extender,” such that, for example, “clear*” would retrieve 
“clear”, “clearly”, and “clearer.” “(one /2 conclusion)” represents a retrieval of any instance 
where the word “one” appeared within two words of the word “conclusion,” such as, for 
example, both “one conclusion” and “one obvious conclusion” were retrieved. 
 97. Cf. infra Section II.B.2 (discussing the study’s focus on unnecessary assertions of 
certainty and uncertainty, rather than those that are invoked by necessity in applying a legal 
doctrine). For example, the following, contained in a single section of a brief, would be coded 
as containing zero ACs: “The district court’s decision was clearly erroneous. . .[omitted 
discussion]. . . Thus, the district court clearly erred.” 
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one AC, but not in the phrase “Defendant could not have 
comprehended what the officer was saying,” which would count as 
including zero ACs). In short, manual coding provided numerous 
advantages over automated coding, given the goals of this study.  
Despite manual coding’s advantages in the present context, it 
has two important and inevitable drawbacks that are worth 
emphasizing. First, due to the subjectivity involved in deciding 
whether to count this or that term, in context, as an AC or AU, 
manual coding makes replication of results difficult and risks 
reflecting the biases of the coders. Here, coder subjectivity is 
particularly worrisome because I coded the results myself, rather 
than, say, enlisting multiple research assistants to do so 
independently and without awareness of what would or would not 
tend to produce interesting results. Second, due to the time-
consuming nature of manual coding, the resulting sample size is far 
smaller than automated computer coding would have allowed. A 
smaller sample size makes it especially problematic to draw 
inferences about the absence of effects; small effects might be 
present yet only detectable with a larger sample.98 
 
 98. Before reporting the results, it may be useful to briefly describe the ways in which 
previous studies differ from the one reported here. A study by Hinkle et al. considered 
whether district court judges whose political ideology differed from that of the appellate 
judges who review their decisions used more “hedging language” (and more “intensifiers” 
in the “Facts” section of the opinion) than district court judges whose political ideology 
aligned with that of the circuit’s appellate judges. See Hinkle et al., supra note 61. Hinkle et 
al.’s study differed in four important respects from the present study. First, it studied a much 
broader set of linguistic devices (specifically, “intensifiers” and “hedges”) than ACs and AUs 
(of the 86 words and phrases studied by Hinkle et al., only four are coded in the present 
study, and Hinkle et al. only coded them in the Facts section of judicial opinions). See id. at 
427, 429 (defining hedges and intensifiers); COLLINS ESSENTIAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY 415 (2d 
ed. 2006) (explaining that an intensifier is “a word, especially an adjective or adverb, that 
intensifies the meaning of the word or phrase that it modifies, for example, very or 
extremely”). Second, Hinkle et al. used computer-automated coding whereas this Article 
uses manual coding. As a result, whereas the present study omits from its coding non-
discretionary uses of ACs and AUs—most prominently, the use of such words in a formulaic 
legal doctrinal standard—Hinkle et al.’s study includes intensifiers and hedges found in such 
standards. Cf. Epstein, supra note 16, at 2072 n.325 (noting that the computer software 
dictionaries used for automated content analysis like that performed by Hinkle et al. “were 
not designed for legal texts”). Third, Hinkle et al. coded district court language, whereas the 
present study coded appellate court language (which is typically written with less possibility 
of reversal, among other differences). Fourth, Hinkle et al. did not examine several of the 
variables considered in the present study, including, e.g., the impact of briefs, and the 
number of citations an opinion receives. 
  Two other studies share many of the same distinguishing features. In the first one, 
for example, Corley and Wedeking did computer-automated content analysis of 110 
 
003.MACLEOD_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:54 PM 
473 Reporting Certainty 
 501 
 
Finally, before turning to the results, a brief note on the 
regression models used to analyze the data. There are two kinds of 
dependent variables in the results reported below. First, there are 
binary outcomes (appellant win versus appellant loss),99 for which 
I use logistic regression.100 Second, there are count outcomes 
(counts of AC or AU per 10,000 words in a given document),101 for 
which I use quasipoisson regression, as is common where, as here, 
count data show evidence of overdispersion.102 To ensure that 
 
Supreme Court cases, coding 83 words or phrases associated with “authoritativeness,” or 
“certainty” (including only six of the terms coded in the present study). Pamela C. Corley & 
Justin Wedeking, The (Dis)Advantage of Certainty: The Importance of Certainty in Language, 48 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 35, 36–37 (2014) (coding as indicia of “certain” or “authoritative” tone, 
e.g., the words “all,” “every,” “fact,” “must,” and “never,” and concluding that lower courts 
are more likely to follow Supreme Court cases written using these authoritative words). In 
the second, Long and Christianson studied briefs filed in state and federal court, coding 
intensifiers—the same broader set of linguistic devices Hinkle et al. studied—rather than 
ACs or AUs, and analyzing their effect on litigant win rates. Lance N. Long & William F. 
Christensen, Clearly, Using Intensifiers Is Very Bad—or Is It?, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 171 (2008) 
[hereinafter Long & Christensen, Intensifiers] (studying the effect of briefs’ intensifiers on 
litigant win rates and concluding that they have a mixed effect, sometimes decreasing and 
other times increasing win rates). 
 99. See infra note 108 (reporting relation between brief AC usage and appellant win 
versus appellant loss). 
 100. See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 79, at 22 (explaining appropriateness of logistic 
regression for binary outcome variables such as appellant win versus appellant loss). 
 101. When used as independent variables, AC and AU usage per 10,000 words were 
standardized, which means that they were centered (had their means subtracted) and 
divided by their standard deviation, over the entire data set, prior to the estimation 
procedure. The result is a standardized predictor, which expresses the quantity in terms of 
number of standard deviations above or below the mean value. This is done to make it easier 
to understand the result: the effects of different independent variables can be compared 
directly. Thus, the effect of increases in the rate of AC become directly comparable with 
increases in the rate of AU, despite the fact that, in absolute terms, these numbers are on 
different scales. 
 102. See, e.g., Hinkle et al., supra note 61, at 429 (“Since these are count data that show 
evidence of overdispersion, we use quasipoisson models.”) (citing JOHN FOX, APPLIED 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS (2d ed. 2008)); William Gardner et 
al., Regression Analyses of Counts and Rates: Poisson, Overdispersed Poisson, and Negative 
Binomial Models, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 392, 396–99 (1995). The Poisson distribution is defined 
in terms of the rate of occurrence of a specific outcome in a large set of events, taking this to 
be interchangeable with a count, under the assumption that the size of the large set of events 
is always the same. But here, the counts of AC and AU are taken from documents with 
different total numbers of words. I thus added the logarithm of the total number of words in 
the given document as an offset for each observation. (For opinions, total words were 
counted. For briefs, word counts were imputed using the number of words per page—
calculated using a random set of twenty briefs spanning the three circuits; all three circuits 
had the same font and spacing requirements during the relevant period—multiplied by the 
number of pages.) The offset is a constant term added to each observation that does not affect 
the estimation procedure. Unless otherwise noted, “greater or lesser AC or AU usage” and 
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modeling choice did not unduly influence results, I also ran the 
more basic Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and compared 
the results to the quasipoisson regression results. The two models 
generated consistent results, with only a few inconsequential 
exceptions (noted below),103 thereby demonstrating the robustness 
of the results. 
 b. Results. By way of concise summary: None of the five theor-
ies fares very well. The Appendix contains a table summarizing 
the results, but here is a brief description of each prediction and its 
fit, or lack of fit, with the data.104 
(1) Misguided persuasion. The misguided persuasion account 
generated three predictions. First, the account predicted that the 
best judges and lawyers would avoid ACs. With respect to judges, 
using elite law school attendance as a proxy for judge quality, the 
data reveal no significant difference.105 That said, with respect to 
lawyers, the prediction arguably fared better: the federal 
government’s briefs did indeed contain fewer ACs than other 
litigants’ briefs, and top law firms’ briefs likewise contained fewer 
ACs than other litigants’ briefs (though the effect for law firms was 
not statistically significant).106 Second, the account predicted that 
 
similar phrases herein refer not to absolute numbers of ACs and AUs in a given document, 
but rather to frequency, or rate, of ACs or AUs in a given document, adjusting for the length 
(i.e., number of words) in the document. 
 103. Specifically, there was one instance in which the use of an OLS model would make 
results that the quasipoisson model shows to be statistically significant (at the .05 level) 
instead nonsignificant. See infra note 119 (dissents used significantly more ACs than majority 
opinions in the presence of a dissent (4.02 times more, 25.17 versus 6.90 per 10,000 words; p 
= 0.001) (OLS: p = 0.13)). And there were two instances in which an OLS model would make 
results that the quasipoisson model shows to be marginally significant (at the .10 level) 
instead be not marginally significant, or vice versa. See infra notes 114 (female judges use 1.19 
times more AUs (p = 0.43) (OLS: p = 0.08)), 183 (Unified panels had an average of 1.82 AUs 
per 10,000 words, versus 2.50 for nonunified panels (p = 0.09) (OLS: p = .35)). 
  While on the subject of caution in interpreting the results, it is worth stressing 
again that failure to detect a statistically significant relationship between two variables, a 
null result, can lead to the conclusion that there is no relationship between those variables, 
but extra caution is needed to avoid a false negative, such as those generated by small or 
unrepresentative samples. 
 104. See Appendix Table 2. 
 105. The slight decrease in AC usage among judges who attended elite law schools is 
nonsignificant (0.84 times lower AC usage rate, p = 0.33). 
 106. Federal government litigants had an average of 6.29 ACs per 10,000 words, versus 
12.21 for other litigants (p < 0.0001). Top law firms had an average of 9.53 ACs per 10,000 
words, versus 12.34 for other non-government litigants (p = 0.27). Although top law firm 
status was not a statistically significant predictor of AC usage, this may have been due to the 
extremely small number of top law firm briefs (only 14) in the dataset. 
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opinions using more ACs would be less influential, at the very least 
outside their circuits (where their force as precedent rests in their 
persuasiveness). But the data provide no support for this 
prediction.107 Third and finally, the account predicted that litigants 
using more ACs would be more likely to lose. But the data show no 
significant relation between higher use of ACs and the odds of 
winning or losing.108 
(2) Reactive escalation. The “reactive escalation” account 
predicted that judges’ AC use would correlate with litigants’ AC 
use (either responding to losing brief or parroting winning brief). 
But neither the winning litigant’s heavier use of ACs, nor the losing 
litigant’s heavier use of ACs, showed a significant relation to the 
rate at which the resulting judicial opinion used ACs.109 As applied 
 
 107. Regarding ACs, an increase of one standardized unit of AC in an opinion was 
associated with a nonsignificant increase in within-circuit citations (1.06 times greater 
within-circuit citations; p = 0.71). Outside circuit citations increased by a nonsignificant factor 
of 1.07 (p = 0.75). One might object that what matters is favorable citations, rather than 
unfavorable or negative ones. Cf. Robert Anderson IV, Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical 
Ranking of Judicial Quality in the United States Court of Appeals, 76 MO. L. REV. 315 (2011). But 
at least using LexisNexis’s favorable and unfavorable citation counts, unfavorable citations 
are so low in number that including them or excluding them changes none of the analysis 
presented here. Cf. Nina Varsava, The Citable Opinion: A Quantitative Analysis of the Style 
and Impact of Judicial Decisions (Oct. 22, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197209. One could weigh negative citations more heavily in the 
analysis to compensate, but the weight would inevitably be somewhat arbitrary, and this 
Article does not attempt such an analysis. 
 108. An increase of one AC in standardized units in appellant opening briefs was 
associated with 0.79 times lower odds of winning the case (p = 0.47). Combining appellant 
opening and reply briefs, an increase of one standardized unit of AC usage was associated 
with 0.79 times lower odds of winning (p = 0.30). An increase of one standardized AC in 
appellee briefs was associated with 1.23 times higher odds of the appellee winning the case 
(p = 0.29). Discrepancies between appellant and appellee AC usage show no significant 
impact. The nonsignificant and very small trend is for relatively high appellant AC usage 
(compared to the appellee) to increase the odds of an appellant win (adding the ratio of 
appellant to appellee AC usage to the model, with appellant usage partialed out, gives an 
estimated increase in the odds of winning of 1.16, p = 0.23). The upshot is this: the oft-made 
claim that certainty rhetoric signals losing arguments—like the popular claim that long briefs 
signal losing arguments—likely says more about judges’ interests generally than about how 
to vindicate litigants’ interests in any given case. Compare, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The Wrong 
Stuff, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 325 (claiming that long briefs signal losing arguments), and Robbins, 
supra note 9, at 280–81 (same), with Sisk & Heise, supra note 83 (finding that longer briefs are 
sometimes advantageous). The dataset here is consistent with Sisk & Heise’s findings, and 
also reveals that the federal government and top law firms may, on average, file longer briefs 
than do other litigants. 
 109. A one unit increase in standardized AC in the winning litigant’s brief was 
associated nonsignificantly with 1.002 times greater AC usage in the resulting opinion (p = 
0.98). A one unit increase in standardized AC in the losing litigant’s brief was associated 
nonsignificantly with 0.87 times lower AC use in the resulting opinion (p = 0.14). 
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to the subset of cases containing a dissent, the reactive escalation 
account predicted that both the majority and dissent would use 
more ACs and fewer AUs than usual. This prediction, though 
initially intuitive, appears only half right: cases with dissenting 
opinions have greater AC usage than cases without;110 
interestingly, though, AUs increase by a roughly equivalent 
proportion when a dissent is present,111 with the increase in AUs 
occurring both in the majority opinion and in the dissent.112 
(3) Extralegal communication style. The “extralegal 
communication style” account predicted greater AC usage and 
lesser AU usage by male authors compared to female authors, and 
white authors compared to nonwhite authors. But gender and race 
showed no significant relation to AC usage.113 And although female 
authors did use AUs slightly more frequently than male authors (a 
result that was not statistically significant using the  
quasipoisson model, and was only marginally significant using the 
OLS model),114 nonwhite authors appeared significantly less  
likely to use AUs, contrary to the extralegal communication style  
account’s prediction.115 
(4) Power-grabbing. The power-grabbing account predicted that 
ideologically unified panels would use more ACs than 
ideologically nonunified panels. But the ideological unity or 
disunity of the panel—that is, whether or not the panel members 
 
 110. Opinions in cases with a dissent had an average of 2.80 times more ACs than 
opinions in cases without a dissent (17.84 per 10,000 words, versus 6.36; p = 0.0001). Almost 
all of the difference is driven by the dissenting opinion’s increased ACs, with majority 
opinions in the presence of a dissent using approximately the same frequency of ACs as 
majority opinions in the absence of a dissent. Infra note 119. 
 111. Opinions in cases with a dissent had an average of 2.65 times more AUs (5.79 per 
10,000 words, versus 2.19; p < 0.0001) than cases without. 
 112. Majority opinions in the presence of a dissent had significantly more AUs than 
those without (1.87 times more, 3.74 per 10,000 words versus 2.00; p = 0.01). Compared to 
majority opinions in cases without a dissent, dissenting opinions contained a much higher 
rate of AU usage (3.03 times more, 6.08 per 10,000 words versus 2.00; p < 0.0001). Dissents 
also used a greater rate of AUs than did majority opinions in the presence of a dissent, though 
the difference was not statistically significant (1.62 times more, 6.08 per 10,000 words versus 
3.74; p = 0.21). 
 113. Female judges show nonsignificantly greater AC usage, 1.022 times higher (p = 
0.92). Nonwhite judges show nonsignificantly lower AC usage, 0.79 times as high (p = 0.43). 
 114.  Female judges use 1.19 times more AUs (p = 0.43) (OLS: p = 0.08). 
 115. Nonwhite judges showed significantly lower AU usage, .45 times as much  
(p = 0.01).  
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were all nominated by the same political party—showed no 
significant relation to AC usage.116 
(5) Legitimacy bolstering. The legitimacy bolstering account 
made three predictions. Its first prediction was that opinions 
concerning Fourth Amendment searches and seizures would 
contain more ACs than cases concerning commercial contract 
disputes, but this appears not to be the case.117 Its second and third 
predictions fared even worse: the account predicted that dissenting 
opinions would contain fewer ACs than majority opinions 
generally, but the opposite is true;118 and the account predicted that 
majority opinions in the presence of a dissent would contain more 
ACs than majority opinions in cases without a dissent, but there 
was almost no such increase in the dataset (instead, the increase in 
AC usage in cases with split opinions was almost entirely 
attributable to the dissent itself).119 
* * * 
In sum, the five accounts examined above do not fare especially 
well (though to be sure, none has been disproven). Each account 
faced problems as a matter of intuitive plausibility, and none found 
much support in the empirical data, which both failed to 
corroborate the accounts’ predictions and revealed associations 
between variables that are in serious tension with the accounts. 
We are left, then, with the puzzle we started with, though at 
least we are now able to add some precision to the claim that 
unnecessary certainty rhetoric pervades legal discourse and is 
heavily skewed towards assertions of certainty, rather than 
uncertainty: Judicial opinions contained an average of 7.03 ACs and 
2.43 AUs per 10,000 words, and briefs contained an average of 10.06 
ACs and 0.84 AUs per 10,000 words. Even if these figures are 
difficult to evaluate without a comparator class of non-legal texts, 
 
 116. Unified panels had an average of 6.66 ACs per 10,000 words, versus 7.84 for 
nonunified panels (p = 0.38). 
 117. Fourth Amendment opinions had an average of 7.40 ACs per 10,000 words, versus 
5.95 for commercial contracts (p = 0.11). 
 118. See supra note 110. 
 119. Majority opinions in the presence of a dissent had slightly more ACs than those 
without (1.10 times more, 6.90 per 10,000 words versus 6.26; p = 0.61). Dissents used ACs far 
more frequently than majority opinions without a dissent (4.02 times more, 25.17 per 10,000 
words versus 6.26; p < 0.0001). Dissents also used significantly more ACs than majority 
opinions in the presence of a dissent (3.65 times more, 25.17 versus 6.90 per 10,000 words; p 
= 0.001) (OLS: p = 0.13). 
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the frequency of AC usage is well above the recommended rate of 
zero, and the relative infrequency of AUs shows that legal rhetoric 
is heavily skewed toward assertions of certainty as opposed to 
uncertainty. Moreover, this was broadly true across all authors 
regardless of quality: Even the best judges and lawyers express 
certainty at alarming rates.120 Why? To what effect? And is it really 
a bad thing—for individual authors, and more importantly, for the 
judicial system as a whole? 
II. RELATIVE CERTAINTY REPORTING AS EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT 
The previous section showed that, despite universal 
disparagement of certainty rhetoric, judges and litigants frequently 
employ it, and employ it in ways that appear inconsistent with the 
core predictions of the five theories of its causes and effects—each 
of which was in any event problematic on its merits even without 
the aid of empirical data. This Part articulates a new account of 
judicial certainty rhetoric, focusing primarily on the independent 
theoretical motivations for the account, but noting along the way 
how it better coheres with the empirical data than do the five 
previous accounts, and how its normative implications differ from 
those accounts’ normative implications. 
The discussion of this Article’s new account—the “efficient 
management” account—proceeds as follows: 
Section II.A shows how certainty rhetoric, understood in 
context (as it is by its primary audiences) reports certainty relative 
to an already high-certainty rhetorical baseline. As a result, 
certainty rhetoric tends to be more nuanced and informative  
than has been appreciated, is less likely to be objectively false  
than is often claimed, and is more likely to be sincere than the 
literature implies. 
Section II.B addresses the two judicial preferences that are the 
primary causes of judicial certainty rhetoric: judges desire to (1) 
maintain good individual reputation and (2) provide useful 
information to other actors in the judicial system. Specifically, 
section II.B.1 explains how individual reputation concerns constrain 
and motivate judges’ statements of relative certainty, rendering 
them credible signals of more than just a single author’s subjective 
 
 120. See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text; Appendix Table 2. 
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certainty. Section II.B.2 examines some important ways in which 
these credible signals are useful tools for managing the judicial system 
in an era of expanding caseloads, efficiently conveying relevant 
information to various audiences and thereby diminishing 
inefficient informational asymmetries and reducing decision costs. 
Section II.C considers the effects of current judicial certainty 
norms on judicial decision-making and argues that the effects are 
not as bad as they are often portrayed. And while an increase in 
baseline levels of expressed uncertainty may be desirable, the shift 
could also have unintended consequences that many would find 
objectionable—potentially decreasing both judicial deliberation 
and a type of error-reducing minimalism that currently permeates 
judicial decision-making. 
Section II.D discusses the relation between relative certainty 
reporting, understood as a tool for efficient management of the 
judiciary, and recent work in the philosophical field of social 
epistemology—specifically, that literature’s insights concerning 
peer disagreement and truth-conducive institutional design. The 
section concludes that insofar as the judicial system aims not just at 
efficiency but also at discovery and maintenance of factual and 
legal “truth” over time, judges ought to report relative certainty at 
least as often, and probably more often, than they presently do. 
A. Rhetorical Baselines and Relative Certainty 
ACs sometimes convey relative or comparative certainty; they 
convey not that the truth of some proposition is “obvious” or 
“indisputable” in an objective, acontextual sense, but that it is more 
obviously or more undoubtedly true than some other set of 
propositions. Sometimes ACs do so explicitly, as when an author 
writes, “Perhaps X, but certainly Y.”121 I suspect that those who 
 
 121. From the dataset, see, for example, Redding v. Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1, 
531 F.3d 1071, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“While Redding’s role 
in all this was somewhat unclear at this point, certainly Jordan’s account . . . supported a 
reasonable suspicion . . . .” (emphasis added)) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 557 U.S. 364 (2009); 
Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 879 (9th Cir. 2008) (“This government interest is undoubtedly 
relevant to the constitutional balancing inquiry . . . . We are less convinced, however, that the 
government’s interest should inform the threshold question . . . .” (emphasis added)), rev’d, 
562 U.S. 134 (2011). In addition to explicitly specifying greater or lesser certainty, judges 
sometimes explicitly specify identical certainty. See, e.g., Redding, 531 F.3d at 1079 (“It is now 
beyond dispute that the [federal constitutional prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
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disparage ACs on the grounds that they are typically false or 
embarrassingly overblown will at least find such explicitly 
comparative ACs less objectionable than others. Even if in some 
sense legal certainty is “an illusion,”122 and little of what is stated in 
published appellate opinions (and their accompanying briefs) is 
“obvious,” “undoubted,” and the like, at least Y can be more certain, 
more obvious, etc., than X. Comparative certainty rhetoric is not 
only less likely to be false or overblown, but is also more 
informative: Instead of claiming to meet some impossibly high 
standard (i.e., “certainty,” “obviousness,” etc., in a rarefied, 
acontextual sense) comparative certainty statements situate 
propositions in a smaller section of the continuum between the 
obviously false and the obviously true. 
The key further point for present purposes is that ACs and AUs 
implicitly convey relative or comparative certainty, obviousness, 
and the like, and are therefore more informative and less likely to 
be false than has typically been appreciated.123 Three sets of 
propositions serve as implicit comparator classes. First, the 
surrounding propositions in the text in which the AC or AU 
appears. For example, when an author claims that “X, Y, and 
obviously Z,” one naturally infers, without needing to know the 
author or the genre, that the author believes Z to be more obvious 
than X and Y.124 (This is an example of what linguists call 
“conversational implicature.”125) Second, readers at all familiar 
with the author will implicitly interpret the certainty claim relative 
to the rhetorical tenor and level of certainty in the author’s other 
 
seizures applies to] state officers. Equally indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the rights of students against encroachment by public school officials.” 
(emphasis added) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985))). 
 122. Holmes, supra note 7 (“[C]ertainty generally is illusion . . . .”); Llewellyn, supra note 
7; see also LLEWELLYN, supra note 4 (aiming for judicial certainty is “a waste of time”). 
 123. On context’s role in increasing the informativeness of vague terms, see Paul Egré 
& Florian Cova, Moral Asymmetries and the Semantics of Many, 8 SEMANTICS & PRAGMATICS 
13:1 (2015). On implicit contextual norms’ role in generating disagreements that superficially 
appear to concern the truth or falsity of ambiguous claims, but may actually concern implicit 
proposals to update the relevant conversational context, see Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe, 
Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics, 52 NOÛS 109 (2018). 
 124. See, e.g., Redding, 531 F.3d at 1101 (“This does not suggest that the planner 
independently justified the search, and it is certainly not ‘guilt-by-association.’” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 1113 (“I would find this search constitutional, and would certainly forgive the 
Safford Officials’ mistake as reasonable.” (emphasis added)). 
 125. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22–40 (1989). 
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writings or communications.126 An author known for rhetorical 
bombast will signal less by calling something “obvious” than 
would an author known to be more selective in claiming certainty. 
Third, the rhetoric that typifies the genre more generally is an 
important determinant of the implicit rhetorical baseline. When 
interpreting an AC or AU, it matters whether one is reading, say, a 
scientific journal article, a philosophical treatise on the existence of 
the external world, or a judicial decision. Different rhetorical 
contexts have different norms concerning expressed degree of 
certainty, and readers implicitly interpret ACs and AUs according 
to those norms and their concomitant rhetorical baselines. 
So certainty rhetoric, understood in context by sufficiently 
informed observers, implicitly signals certainty, obviousness, etc., 
relative to claims made in the document, in the author’s other 
communications, and in the genre more broadly—in effect making 
more nuanced and potentially informative claims concerning degree of 
certainty than is typically assumed.127 By the same token, certainty 
rhetoric is less likely to be false or overblown than is often alleged.128 
Something may be “obvious” for purposes of an appellate case 
outcome while being nonobvious for other purposes; the  
difference is reflected in the rhetorical baseline, and is readily and 
implicitly understood by judicial opinions’ primary audiences 
(judges and lawyers).129 
Moving now from the charges of uninformativeness and falsity, 
consider the charge of insincerity. To the sincerity skeptic, the stuff 
of published appellate opinions (and the accompanying briefs) 
simply isn’t obvious, undoubted, etc. If it were, then the case would 
not have gotten to appellate court and be the subject of a published 
appellate opinion. Surely judges are smart enough not to believe 
their certainty rhetoric, and yet they persist in using it; hence their 
certainty rhetoric must be insincere. The above discussion  
suggests one possible response to the sincerity skeptic: assuming 
judges tend not to believe false or overblown things, the context-
 
 126. Cf. Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Calibrating Legal Judgments, 9 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 125 (2017) (discussing the common practice, when evaluating a given 
judgment, of considering other judgments made by the utterer of the judgment presently 
under consideration). 
 127. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 1–11. 
 128. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9–10. 
 129. What matters for practical purposes is whether rhetorical baselines remain stable 
enough to permit informative deviations, a point to which I will return below. 
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relative nature of certainty rhetoric—which renders certainty 
rhetoric less likely to be false or overblown—in turn renders more 
plausible the possibility that judges sincerely believe their own 
certainty rhetoric. 
But the sincerity skeptic might double down, asserting that 
even with wiggle room for high baseline levels of certainty, 
appellate judges cannot seriously consider the stuff of published 
appellate opinions obvious, undoubted, etc., by any stretch of those 
terms. At least, they cannot do so nearly as often as they claim to, 
leaving most certainty rhetoric insincere. The next section will 
provide a more affirmative case for believing judicial certainty 
rhetoric to be sincere, but for now, here are two reasons to  
remain open-minded about the possibility of sincerity in judicial 
certainty rhetoric. 
First, recent evidence from experimental psychology indicates 
that even highly skilled judges and lawyers may feel every bit as 
certain as their opinions and briefs suggest, regardless of whether 
this certainty strikes outsiders as misguided.130 Familiar 
psychological phenomena131—“over-confidence bias,”132 
“confirmation bias,”133 and the tendency to engage in “motivated” 
or “coherence-based” reasoning134—highlight that people tend to 
 
 130. See, e.g., Simon & Scurich, supra note 2, at 421 (explaining that the “cognitive 
explanation” for “judicial overstating” posits that “judges portray their decisions as 
singularly-correct because that is the way they actually perceive the legal dispute at the time 
they make their decision”). 
 131. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Avani Mehta 
Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review, 9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 
307 (2013). 
 132. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 131; Sood, supra note 131. A 
related bias is the “superiority bias”—believing ourselves better than average at all sorts of 
tasks, including formation of correct beliefs. See Mark D. Alicke & Olesya Govorun,  
The Better-Than-Average Effect, in THE SELF IN SOCIAL JUDGMENT 85 (Mark D. Alicke et al.,  
eds., 2005). 
 133. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998) (explaining that we are more likely to note and take 
seriously evidence supporting our views than evidence tending to undermine our views, 
and more likely to construe equivocal pieces of evidence as confirming, rather than 
disconfirming, our views). 
 134. See Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision 
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 532–33 (2004) [hereinafter Simon, Third View] (explaining that, 
when confronted with a difficult decision, people engage in “motivated” or “coherence-
based” reasoning: preliminary conclusions—even tentative ones—tend to feed back into our 
reasoning process, making us more confident in our conclusions as we consider them and 
seek to articulate or persuade others of them, regardless whether we have good reason to 
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feel more confident that their beliefs are correct (and obviously so) 
than is warranted. Lawyers and judges may be especially prone to 
over-confidence in the correctness and obviousness of their 
assertions:135 Lawyers come to “believe their own hype” as they 
contemplate and hone the arguments in favor of their clients’ 
positions;136 judges develop the same “habit of mind” in their 
earlier careers as lawyers, and, once they are on the bench, that 
habit is further cemented by persistent exposure to lawyers’ 
overblown assertions of certainty.137 Finally, the process of writing 
a judicial opinion, much like writing a legal brief, involves repeated 
exposure to and articulation of one’s own arguments.138 In sum, 
experimental psychology provides reason to think certainty 
rhetoric (and the corresponding paucity of uncertainty statements) 
is more sincere than it may appear to the detached observer. 
Second, the data reported in Part I provide some additional 
reasons to remain open-minded toward the possibility of sincere 
judicial certainty rhetoric. Recall that the explanatory proposal 
seemingly most supportive of the insincerity hypothesis—the 
“power-grabbing” account—failed to find confirmation in the 
 
grow more sure of them); Dan Simon et al., The Emergence of Coherence over the Course of 
Decision Making, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1250 (2001). 
 135. See Elgen & Listoken, supra note 74 (providing evidence that lawyers tasked with 
arguing for a particular position become more confident of that position’s being correct than 
they would have had they been tasked with arguing for the contrary position); Jane 
Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 137 (2010); Lewis D. Solomon, Perspectives on Curriculum 
Reform in Law Schools: A Critical Assessment, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992) (describing  
the adversarial nature of the U.S. legal curriculum and arguing that it trains lawyers to 
eschew doubt). 
 136. Elgen & Listoken, supra note 74, at 241. Lawyers representing a client at trial or on 
appeal are perhaps even more likely to exhibit irrationally inflated certainty than lawyers at 
earlier stages of a case: not only have they spent more time arguing for their client’s position 
(and considering the client’s perspective), but the mere fact that their case has not settled 
suggests that at least one side in the litigation has an irrationally inflated sense of confidence 
in its likelihood of prevailing. See Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1457, 1491 (2003) (explaining that, under a “litigant-driven” model 
of litigation, “[w]hen cases do proceed to trial or are appealed [rather than settling], the 
parties presumably have significantly divergent expectations about the outcome”). 
 137. See Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction 
Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75, 85–86 (1998) (“Repeated exposure to adversaries’ arguments, 
set up as opposing poles, establish a habit of mind for judges who in turn write opinions as 
though they present a preordained correct answer, which embraces by necessity only one 
position or viewpoint.”); Simon, Psychological Model, supra note 2, at 1. 
 138. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1283, 1309 (2008); Simon, Third View, supra note 134. 
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data.139 Moreover, positing sincerity would help explain the 
findings concerning ideologically diverse panels’ increased AU 
usage, as well as dissenters’ increased AC and AU usage.140 As to 
the former, a candid and sincere report of an ideologically diverse 
panel’s consensus position seems likely to contain more AUs than 
an ideologically unified panel’s decision. As for dissenters’ 
increased AC and AU usage, whereas a panel of three may often 
agree on case outcome and reasoning without agreeing on the 
attendant degree of certainty (in which case relative certainty may 
go unreported), a single dissenter writing for himself faces no such 
constraint. Split opinions offer an opportunity to sincerely report 
relative certainty without any need to confer with colleagues as to 
this technically unnecessary (but practically useful) feature of the 
judge’s decision. Again, more will be said about sincerity further 
on, but the contention that judicial certainty rhetoric is sincere 
should at this stage at least not seem surprising or outlandish. 
In sum, appreciating the context-relative nature of judicial 
certainty rhetoric helps highlight how it could be (a) more nuanced 
and informative, (b) less likely to be false or overblown, and (c) less 
likely to be insincere, than the conventional views assume. But that 
does not explain much about its actual causes or effects. It is also, 
from a normative perspective, faint praise: Just because it lacks 
some of the negative traits conventionally attributed to it does not 
mean certainty rhetoric is on the whole beneficial. Still, only after 
having shown that judicial certainty rhetoric is neither false nor 
insincere can the main deontological objections to it be put aside, 
leaving room for an examination of its causes and effects that can 
yield interesting normative implications.141 So let’s now examine 
the causes and effects of certainty rhetoric in judicial opinions and, 
in the process, note some actual benefits it may have. 
 
 139. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text; Appendix Table 2. 
 141. For more on those deontological objections, see sources cited supra notes 35–36. 
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B. Explaining the Presence and Credibility 
of Judicial Certainty Reporting 
1. Individual Reputation as Constraint (and Motivation) 
Judges want to improve or at least preserve their individual 
reputations.142 This desire constrains their use of certainty 
rhetoric.143 Judges know that they cannot purchase esteem and 
good individual reputation by reporting greater certainty than 
others.144 Indeed, such a strategy would backfire: resorting to 
certainty rhetoric where others might disagree would make a judge 
less esteemed and less likely to be upheld on appeal, since his signal 
would become mere noise—or worse, if routinely used to cover up 
areas of uncertainty—to the judges reviewing his opinions on 
appeal. Those judges, after all, have repeated exposure to his 
work.145 Even for intermediate appellate judges, whose work is 
rarely reviewed by the Supreme Court, calling things obvious that 
are not obvious is at best unlikely to impress colleagues, and at 
worst likely to embarrass the author, given the seemingly universal 
 
 142. See GAROUPA & GINSBURG, supra note 31. 
 143. District court judges have perhaps the most to lose by abusing the rhetoric of 
certainty, and the most to gain from admitting uncertainty in close cases, the latter approach 
serving to blunt reputational blowback in the event of reversal. Because appellate judges 
have little to no chance of reversal in most cases (and Supreme Court Justices have essentially 
none), both may become somewhat less inclined toward AU usage and more haphazard with 
AC usage. Still, they remain unlikely to falsely report for strategic purposes greater  
certainty than they actually feel, since doing so would tend to be largely ineffective and 
diminish their reputation. 
  As an aside, most lawyers do not face the sort of reputational constraints that lead 
judges to selectively and sincerely report relative certainty. (One partial exception might be 
institutional repeat-player litigants such as U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, who used fewer ACs than 
did other litigants in the data reported above. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.) 
 144. In this way they may be different from private adjudicators and lawyers. See supra 
note 69 (noting private adjudicators’ incentives to exaggerate certainty). Indeed, unless a 
lawyer represents a large public body like the federal government, there may be a temptation 
to use certainty rhetoric to “cheaply” impress clients. Lawyers need to be perceived as 
“zealously” representing their clients even when they know their client will almost certainly 
lose, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018), and, more 
cynically, private lawyers also must assure their clients that there is good reason the case has 
not settled and the lawyers are still being paid. Cf. Cross, supra note 136 (explaining that, 
under a “litigant-driven” model of litigation, “[w]hen cases do proceed to trial or are 
appealed [rather than settling], the parties presumably have significantly divergent 
expectations about the outcome”); Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 135, at 136 
(discussing reasons why it is often in lawyers’ professional interest to exude confidence). 
 145. On the other hand, for district courts, certainty rhetoric regarding factual 
assertions might sometimes help shield an opinion from review without risking individual 
reputational harm. 
003.MACLEOD_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
514 
 
disdain for ACs.146 Consequently, regardless of the institutional 
reputation concerns that may have brought about the uniformly 
high baseline level of certainty rhetoric characteristic of current 
legal discourse,147 individual reputation concerns constrain the 
degree of departure from that baseline. And by constraining 
certainty rhetoric, individual reputation concerns help render it a 
credible signal. 
Individual reputation concerns also help explain the presence 
and credibility of judicial statements of uncertainty. By expressing 
uncertainty as to a proposition the authoring judge considers 
dubious or vulnerable to attack, the judge can lower the 
reputational cost of reversal or other criticism or negative reaction 
from judicial colleagues. This helps explain the increased use of 
AUs in the majority and dissenting opinions where panels are 
split.148 Statements of uncertainty are thus likely to provide credible 
information about what propositions the authoring judge finds 
dubious, less likely to garner other judges’ agreement, or otherwise 
vulnerable to attack. 
The safest strategy given individual reputational concerns, 
then, is for judges to report certainty and uncertainty (when they 
do so) sincerely—that is, only report certainty or uncertainty when 
they genuinely believe something to be certain or uncertain.149 But 
 
 146. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 1–7; Section I.A.5. 
 148. See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text. 
 149. One might object to this claim about the likelihood of sincerity along the following 
lines: You’ve shown that judges will claim certainty and uncertainty in accordance with 
whether they think other judges will agree or disagree with them, but that’s not sincere 
reporting about what one actually considers certain or uncertain; instead, it’s a prediction 
about others’ views, masquerading as what the author thinks. In response, and without 
getting into deep arguments about the nature of law, I’ll simply note that in law, more so 
than in many other fields (e.g., mathematics), the truth of many propositions depends in an 
important sense on how other legal actors treat them. A judge’s contention that “the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits X” is in an important sense not true if the Supreme Court states 
otherwise in a binding opinion. This is apparent to intermediate appellate judges whose 
contentions might be reversed on appeal, but it applies even to propositions endorsed by 
Supreme Court Justices, whose rulings can be adopted or rejected in more authoritative 
texts—namely, later Supreme Court rulings. The point is not merely that law counsels 
epistemic humility; after all, other fields do too—mathematicians possess warranted 
uncertainty where they are concerned others will disagree with their conclusions and that 
those others will turn out to be right. The point is instead that law is a social practice wherein 
a judge’s statements about the law (and sometimes, in certain respects, about the facts that 
are to govern the resolution of a case) may be rendered untrue by virtue of other legal actors’ 
disagreement expressed in authoritative texts. For the objection noted at the beginning of 
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even if judges are likely to be sincere when they report relative 
certainty, why should they ever bother to report it, rather than  
stay silent about it? Whereas reputational concerns help explain  
the presence or motivation for occasional reports of uncertainty,  
they do little to explain the presence of, or motivation for,  
reporting certainty. 
2. Managerial Concerns as Motivation (and Constraint) 
The information conveyed by relative certainty reporting is not 
just credible and sincerely given; it is also relevant and useful to 
judges, lawyers, and litigants. Indeed, that is a large part of why 
judges choose to report relative certainty and uncertainty. 
According to the “efficient management” account, judges desire to 
write useful opinions that efficiently guide other resource-
constrained judges, lawyers, and litigants,150 and they use certainty 
rhetoric toward that end. In short, by sincerely reporting a piece of 
information that is cheap for the judge to obtain (all it requires is 
brief introspection) and to convey (an additional word or phrase 
will do), judges further their goal of managing the judiciary.151 Let’s 
 
this footnote to hold, not only would some judges need to be staunch anti-positivists, but 
those very same judges would need to be reporting certainty not in accordance with their 
view of what the law is but rather in accordance with their predictions of what others agree 
the “law” is. But for most judges, there is not such a yawning gap between the law and what 
authoritative legal texts (like binding judicial decisions) declare the law to be. To sincerely 
report an estimation of one is typically to sincerely report an estimation of the other. Cf. 
Holmes, supra note 7, at 461 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing 
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”). 
 150. Granted, judges (like lawyers) may sometimes write with audiences outside the 
legal system in mind. For example, judges and lawyers may attempt to persuade the public 
or garner media attention. Cf., Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 667, 667–68 (2015) (discussing rhetoric in high-profile Supreme Court 
constitutional decisions and its impact on national “constitutional discourse”). In the vast 
majority of cases, though, both of those audiences will be largely irrelevant. See Popkin, supra 
note 73 (“[I]t is . . . unlikely that the general public will pay much attention to the way judges 
write opinions. . . . [W]hat evidence we have on public acceptance of judicial opinions 
stresses substantive results, not judicial style, as the most important criterion in gaining 
public support”) (citing VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS (2003)); see also Simon & Scurich, supra note 51 (assessing laypeople’s reactions to 
mock judicial opinions and determining that agreement with the outcome far outstripped 
any other attribute of an opinion in predicting whether laypeople assessed the opinion 
positively). Nonetheless, elected judges, like certain public lawyers, may write with greater 
concern for lay reactions, particularly as election time nears. See Nelson, supra note 69. 
 151. On further aspects of judges’ judicial management practices, and discussion of 
increasing caseloads, see Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011); 
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now consider the relevance and utility of the information that 
certainty reporting conveys. 
a. Non-doctrinal relevance. Relative certainty statements provide 
useful signals to courts reviewing a decision on appeal, to courts 
consulting an opinion as nonbinding precedent, and to lawyers and 
litigants in the case in which the opinion is written and in future 
cases. I will address each in turn, before addressing, in the next 
section, certainty statements’ more formal, doctrinal relevance. 
First, appellate judges (and their clerks), whether consciously 
or not, may find useful and influential a lower court’s assertion that 
a given proposition is relatively obvious, undoubted, etc. For 
example, the reviewing court may spend less time plumbing the 
record or case law to scrutinize a proposition that the lower court 
thought obvious in a case it deemed easy, particularly where the 
lower court judge has a good reputation.152 As for statements of 
uncertainty, the same reputational concerns that might lead a  
judge to note uncertainty about a given proposition153 may serve  
to efficiently alert the reviewing judge to the vulnerability of a 
given statement. 
For similar reasons, certainty rhetoric may provide useful 
information to judges other than those reviewing the decision on 
appeal, in much the same way that an academic researcher benefits 
from information concerning error rates in a statistical study. Both 
 
Resnick, supra note 33. Of course, if judges were to report relative certainty in thoroughly 
haphazard ways, the signal would lose all utility as a management tool. Moreover, if in such 
a regime judges, lawyers, and litigants mistook such meaningless certainty rhetoric for a 
credible signal, judicial certainty reporting might actually reduce the system’s efficiency. 
Judges’ desire to efficiently manage the judiciary thus constrains judges’ use of certainty 
rhetoric. On the epistemic, rather than efficiency, benefits of relative certainty reporting, see 
infra Section II.D.   
 152. Or, if the proposition at issue appears dubious, the lower court’s credible report of 
its own certainty, even if unwarranted, might again provide useful information; perhaps, for 
example, the lower court and the parties glossed over the issue too readily and failed to 
recognize a contrary argument or fact. In this way, even unwarranted ACs help to flag for a 
reviewing court what may have gone wrong. Moreover, where patterns emerge—patterns 
either of persistent expressions of uncertainty among lower courts concerning a given issue, 
or of emphatic but inconsistent assertions of certainty among lower courts concerning a 
given issue—relative certainty reporting may also help appellate courts decide where to 
allocate their resources. This is true not only for the Supreme Court, which chooses its docket 
through the certiorari process, but also for intermediate appellate courts, which not only 
choose whether to address a given issue en banc, but also whether to write and publish a 
precedential opinion, and how extensive that opinion ought to be with respect to any issue 
it addresses. 
 153. See supra Section II.A and accompanying text. 
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district court and appellate court judges inside or outside of the 
circuit in which an AC appears might benefit when, in determining 
whether to follow, or how broadly to construe, a given decision, 
they have credible information not just about the outcome reached 
and the reasoning, but also about the degree of certainty the 
authoring judge or panel had concerning the various legal and 
factual premises and conclusions comprising the opinion. Time-
constrained judges consulting precedent might rationally and 
desirably be influenced not only by who authored the opinion, but 
also by how confident that author was in the truth of the assertions 
at issue. 
Reporting relative certainty might reduce decision costs not just 
for judges consulting the case (on appeal or for persuasive 
precedent), but also for lawyers attempting to predict the law going 
forward.154 Those predictions may concern the same litigation (i.e., 
for purposes of determining whether to settle,155 to move for 
reconsideration, to appeal, etc.). Or they may concern future cases 
(i.e., for purposes of determining how likely future courts are to 
defer to, and to distinguish or extend, a given decision). 
And litigants themselves (as opposed to their lawyers) may 
obtain from judicial certainty rhetoric a rare piece of relatively 
disinterested feedback concerning their counsel.156 In appellate 
cases, the client’s counsel has taken the statistically unusual step of 
foregoing settlement, and may, due to pecuniary self-interest or 
irrationally inflated confidence, have overly encouraged the client 
to continue litigating the case. For many litigants, the judge’s 
feedback may be the only check on what the client has been told by 
her counsel. Indeed, in extreme cases, judicial certainty rhetoric 
may alert a litigant not just to the need to find new lawyers in the 
 
 154. This sort of predictability about how judges will decide future cases is precisely 
the sort of “legal certainty” with which most American Legal Realists were concerned. See, 
e.g., Holmes, supra note 7, at 461 (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal 
Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997). 
 155. For example, it is common practice to closely review a judge’s prior decisions to 
determine how good or bad a “draw” she is, with chances of settlement increasing to the 
extent more information is available concerning her likely disposition toward the case—an 
inquiry that relative certainty reporting in those earlier cases aids. 
 156. Cf. Moss, supra note 47, at 65–66 (arguing that “[l]egal services markets do not 
readily drive out bad performance[,]” and clients’ “imperfect information”—in part 
attributable to “how hard briefs are for laypeople to . . . analyze”—leads them to 
“persistently choose” bad lawyers). 
003.MACLEOD_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/14/20  1:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
518 
 
future, but also to a potential malpractice suit or ineffective 
assistance claim (or, on the flip side, judicial certainty rhetoric 
might alert the litigant or her counsel to the likelihood of obtaining 
Rule 11 sanctions against the other side or of bringing a meritorious 
malicious prosecution suit). 
In sum, the “efficient management” account posits that 
intermediate appellate judges attempt to provide useful 
information that facilitates the efficient disposition of cases.157 This 
information may not be strictly relevant as a matter of doctrine, but 
then again neither is the authoring judge’s name. Relative certainty 
rhetoric, like a signed opinion, is a useful tool for managing the 
judiciary efficiently. 
b. Doctrinal relevance. In addition to their less formal relevance 
to resource- and information-constrained actors, relative certainty 
statements sometimes carry direct legal consequences. Many 
doctrinal standards contain ACs—for example, “plain error,” 
“clearly established law,” and “beyond a reasonable doubt.”158 The 
data reported in Part I do not count these as ACs, since those data 
sought to answer why judges (and litigants) choose to report 
relative certainty discretionarily (i.e., where they need not do so, 
rather than where a legal doctrine necessarily invokes them). But 
even when certainty rhetoric is not invoked as part of a doctrinal 
phrase like “clear error,” and even when it is not invoked during 
analyses directly applying such a standard, it may turn out to  
have bearing on the application of one of those standards at some 
later time.  
 
 157. This emphasis on managerial efficiency may also explain the relative paucity of 
AUs in Fourth Amendment cases. In such cases, police departments are tasked with 
implementing the Supreme Court’s rulings going forward, and may need particularly clear 
rules stated in no uncertain terms. This need for certainty has both a non-doctrinal 
component (in that a police department may need very clear rulings before it changes its 
behavior) and a doctrinal component (in that future applications of the exclusionary rule and 
of qualified immunity may depend on earlier statements of relative certainty). Cf. James A. 
Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J.  
957 (2019). 
 158. See also, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (stating that the words 
“wholly” and “obviously” when used in the phrases “wholly insubstantial” and “obviously 
without merit” have “cogent legal significance” (quoting Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 
(1933)). These and other doctrinal standards, for better or worse, likely both reflect and affect 
the rhetorical baseline in a way that might make difficult the sort of largescale shift in the 
rhetorical baseline (from greater expression of certainty to lesser) that commentators appear 
to favor. 
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 Such future relevance may be more or less foreseeable in 
different contexts, and for this reason it may be a good habit for 
judges to report their relative certainty when they draw conclusions 
accompanied by relative certainty levels that significantly depart 
upward or downward from the rhetorical baseline. As an example, 
consider the rule the Supreme Court articulated in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services159: a court’s 
prior construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court 
decision found that the statute was clear and unambiguous.160 After 
Brand X, courts would be tasked with determining whether prior 
courts had determined a statute was “clear” regarding a disputed 
term, with agency deference dependent on this ex post 
interpretation of judicial opinions issued prior to the rule.161 ACs 
that may not have seemed as important under the prior case law 
became much more important in the wake of Brand X, and the 
content of prior judicial opinions in this regard would henceforth 
require judicial scrutiny.162  
C. Ex Ante Effects of Certainty Norms on Judicial Decision-making 
One prominent argument against the current norm of high 
levels of reported certainty is that it has bad ex ante effects on 
judicial decision-making. If judges are permitted or encouraged to 
write opinions that sweep away difficulties, dismiss potential 
counterarguments as “clearly meritless,” and use claims of 
“obviousness” as substitutes for thorough explanations, why 
would they bother thoroughly considering both sides in the first 
place? If instead judges were expected to refrain from ACs, and to 
use AUs more often, writing in a more tentative or exploratory 
 
 159. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 160. Id. at 982. 
 161. Id. at 1018. 
 162. Other potential examples of more or less foreseeable future doctrinal relevance of 
ACs and AUs abound. One example concerns courts’ (and police departments’) inquiries 
into “clearly established law” for purposes of sovereign immunity. See, John C. Jeffries, 
Jr., What's Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851 (2010) (discussing the 
notoriously murky tests courts use to determine whether law was clearly established). 
Another concerns deference to prior factual or legal determinations. Courts reviewing for 
plain error, for instance, may look to their previous decisions for indications that the type  
of error at issue has previously been deemed “clearly” or “obviously” to have been an error. 
Cf. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.  
643 (2015). 
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tone, this might encourage more deliberation and better 
deliberation. Unfortunately, current rhetorical norms allow or even 
encourage judges to skirt tough issues.163 
While valid, this concern should not be overstated. As to the 
“more deliberation” point, current norms of certainty and 
nonadmission of doubt164 incentivize judges to consider a case until 
they can pronounce a decision confidently.165 Once a judge 
internalizes the norm of writing emphatically certain opinions, 
deliberating until certain is the only way to avoid the 
embarrassment and cognitive dissonance involved in emphatically 
stating that which colleagues and reviewing courts may consider 
mistaken. In the event that resolving the case in a particular way 
results in an opinion that “won’t write” comfortably in accordance 
with current high-certainty norms, it might add pressure to change 
one’s position, or to look for alternative arguments or rationales 
amenable to greater certainty.166 In short, by stripping judges of the 
option to admit uncertainty and cease deliberation, a norm of high 
 
 163. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & David M. Trubek, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint 
and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255, 270 (1961) (contending that for 
judges, “a paramount danger of too quick a grasp at certainty” in legal discourse is that 
judges may “gain a false confidence in their own conclusions” without having “struggle[d] 
quite so hard” to transcend their own biases in the process of arriving at a decision); Simon 
& Scurich, supra note 2, at 419 (arguing that the “tendency to endorse an overstated and one-
sided view of the legal question is bound to prevent judges from appreciating the complexity 
of the case and tempt them to avoid grappling with the painstaking arguments”). 
 164. See Simon, Psychological Model, supra note 2, at 12 n.58 (noting an instance in which 
Justice Breyer’s expression of uncertainty provoked negative media attention, including the 
claim that Breyer’s admission was “disturbing”); POPKIN, supra note 73 (same); Dan Simon, 
Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 1097, 1137 n.95 (2002) (discussing an instance in which media concern arose 
regarding a Delaware judge’s having expressed doubt in a judicial opinion); FED. JUDICIAL 
CTR., supra note 8, at 19 (judicial opinions “should . . . carry conviction”). 
 165. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 2 (1993) (“[T]here is pressure 
on [judges] to speak decisively.”); William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress 
of the Law,” 42 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 948, 962 (1987); Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism, 
supra note 37, at 792 (“Judges frequently observe that the mere fact of having to write an 
opinion affects the process of deciding a case.”). Justice Brandeis once claimed that “the 
difficulty with this place is that if you’re only fifty-five percent convinced of a proposition, 
you have to act and vote as if you were one hundred percent convinced.” Brad Snyder, The 
Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to 
Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1188 n.235 (2010). One way to attempt to reduce that difficulty 
is by deliberating further in hopes of attaining additional certainty (though, to be sure, such 
certainty might never be forthcoming, and if it does come, it may be mistaken). 
 166. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1421, 1447 (1995) (“In thinking about a case, a judge might come to a definite conclusion 
yet find the conclusion indefensible when he tries to write an opinion explaining and 
justifying it.”). 
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certainty and low admission of doubt might bring about more 
deliberation, not less.167 
Of course, it could still be the case that a norm encouraging 
greater admission of uncertainty would produce a better kind of 
deliberation.168 But this contention, too, rests on a somewhat shaky 
foundation. Current certainty norms pressure judges to adhere to a 
type of “minimalism” that is pervasive but often overlooked: 
judges decide cases on the ground that they are most comfortable 
asserting with maximal certainty—typically the easiest possible 
ground for resolution, or the least error-prone one. Certainty norms 
thus influence the issues the court chooses to address (where there 
is more than one potential dispositive issue), as well as the  
rationale for those issues’ resolution.169 At least for intermediate 
appellate courts facing only miniscule chances of reversal, certainty 
norms’ promotion of this form of minimalism may thus prevent 
judges from authoring decisions that rest on less firm, more error-
prone ground. 
In sum, whether or not it is a net positive, the current norm of 
judicial certainty rhetoric may have more mixed ex ante effects on 
judicial decision-making than has been appreciated. Though it may 
be desirable to have a more balanced rhetoric that more often 
admits of uncertainty, those who advocate proceeding in that 
direction have some reason for caution. 
D. Social Epistemology and Relative Certainty Reporting 
The focus on “efficiency” in much of the above discussion may 
turn some readers off, and understandably so; after all, the judicial 
system should be evaluated not merely according to its efficiency 
 
 167. See Sutton, supra note 11, at 862 (“Posner likewise overstates his case in 
maintaining that it is ‘naïve’ to believe that there are right answers to legal questions. . . . This 
perspective . . . enables, if not encourages, judges to minimize the task at hand. Why work at 
answering a difficult legal problem correctly if it is a fool’s errand . . . ?” (citation omitted)); 
Altman, supra note 36 (awareness of discretion loosens bounds). All this said, more 
deliberation is not an unmitigated good, given resource constraints and growing caseloads 
(not to mention the litigants’ desire for speedy case resolution). The key point is whether case 
outcomes improve, and by how much, in light of the trade-offs. 
 168. See POPKIN, supra note 73; supra note 11. 
 169. This form of minimalism is distinguishable from other forms sometimes 
advocated by judges and scholars (e.g., proposals that judges ought to create as little change 
to the status quo as possible, to avoid overturning other branches’ actions, to avoid reaching 
constitutional issues, or to avoid taking sides on deeply contested moral or cultural issues). 
See Sunstein, supra note 39, at 826. 
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but also its accuracy—that is, the extent to which the conclusions it 
reaches tend to be correct. The same goes for evaluating the judicial 
system’s use of certainty reporting. The question is, does such 
rhetoric merely facilitate efficient resolution of disputes, or does it 
also facilitate their correct resolution? Does it, in other words, aid in 
the judiciary’s epistemic, or truth-seeking, goals?170 
A “rapidly developing”171 philosophical literature on “social 
epistemology” considers just such questions,172 though it is only 
now beginning to receive attention from legal scholars.173 My 
description of the field here is very brief, but hopefully allows one 
to appreciate why, from the perspective of social epistemology, 
relative certainty reporting is probably a good thing for the 
judiciary qua epistemic institution. 
Social epistemology “investigat[es] the epistemic effects of 
social interactions and social systems.”174 It is part of a 
“naturalized” program in epistemology that, rather than dwelling 
on idealized processes of knowledge attainment, forefronts “the 
realities of how epistemic processes—processes for the acquisition 
of knowledge—work.”175 This naturalized epistemology 
“tailor[s] . . . normative advice about belief formation” to the 
 
 170. I put aside more fundamental questions concerning the nature of legal, as opposed 
to factual, “truths,” including whether the former is sometimes or always a subcategory of 
the latter. See generally Brian H. Bix, Metaphysical Realism and Legal Reasoning, in LEGAL, 
MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 311 (Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 2016); Scott Hershovitz, The End of Jurisprudence, 124 
YALE L.J. 1160 (2015). 
 171. Stein, supra note 7, at 53. 
 172. For general introductions to the field, see ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, A Guide to Social 
Epistemology, in RELIABILISM AND CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY 221, 226–29 (2012); 
Goldman & Blanchard, supra note 40. 
 173. For two recent examples, see William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler,  
Arguing with Friends, 117 MICH. L. REV. 319 (2018); Stein, supra note 7; see also  
Brian Leiter & Matthew X. Etchemendy, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, in  
THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward. N. Zalda ed., 2017), 
https://plato.standord.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/lawphil-naturalism/ (“Normative 
Naturalism[] is exemplified in epistemology by [Alvin] Goldman . . . but its implications for 
jurisprudence and law have, to date, only been partly developed.”). 
 174. Goldman & Blanchard, supra note 40; see also GOLDMAN, supra note 172, at 228–29 
(describing “systems oriented social epistemology,” which “examine[s] the [epistemic] 
systems [sic] in question to see whether its mode of operation is genuinely conducive to the 
specified epistemic ends”); Goldman & Blanchard, supra note 40 (emphasizing social 
epistemology’s concern with assessing institutional and social practices “in terms of how the 
chosen procedures ‘perform’ in yielding judgments with high truth ratios”). 
 175. Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science 
Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 805. 
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realistic capacities of the individual and institutional knowers at 
issue, in order to critique and improve those individuals’ and 
systems’ tendency towards acquiring true belief in light of their 
acknowledged limitations (e.g., their resource, evidentiary, and 
cognitive constraints).176 Treating these limitations as a given, much 
recent work in social epistemology concerns reliance on others’ 
testimony about their beliefs concerning a given proposition, as a 
source of “second-order” evidence bearing on the truth-value of the 
proposition at issue177—that is, it emphasizes the ways we do, must, 
and should rely on other people’s statements about their own 
beliefs when rationally forming our own.178 
Social epistemology’s core insights apply straightforwardly to 
the judiciary’s practice of reporting relative certainty. Judges 
cannot possibly run every issue to the ground. To arrive at true 
conclusions, they do, must, and should rely at least to some extent 
on the testimony of other judges who have considered a given 
issue. This is true not just as a doctrinal matter (though many 
doctrines, such as stare decisis and deferential appellate review, do 
require granting some deference to others’ opinions); it is also true 
where, for example, judges consult nonbinding opinions outside 
their circuit, or when judges consider the fact that one of their 
colleagues disagrees with them about some issue in a case.179 
How much evidentiary value ought judges assign to other 
judges’ beliefs? That depends, in large part, on the epistemic 
position of the judges in question. Sometimes another judge has 
delved deeper into the relevant primary evidence, has received 
more thorough briefing on the issue, etc., and so is, in the jargon of 
social epistemology, an “epistemic superior,” whose view deserves 
 
 176. Id.; see also, e.g., GOLDMAN, supra note 172; Leiter & Etchemendy, supra note 173. 
 177. See Jonathan Matheson, Disagreement and Epistemic Peers, in OXFORD HANDBOOKS 
ONLINE: SCHOLARLY RESEARCH REVIEWS 5–6 (2015), http://www.oxfordhandbooks. 
com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.13; Richard Feldman, Evidentialism, 
Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement, 6 EPISTEME 294, 295 (2009) (“[E]vidence of peer 
disagreement is . . . higher-order evidence—evidence about the significance of one’s first-
order evidence.”). 
 178. See generally David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey, Introduction to THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT: NEW ESSAYS 1, 1–3 (David Christensen & Jennifer  
Lackey eds., 2013) (outlining issues addressed by recent philosophical work on the 
epistemology of disagreement). 
 179. See Stein, supra note 7. 
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extra deference as to that particular issue.180 Other times, the other 
judge—perhaps on the same panel in a given case—has consulted 
the same evidence, deliberated the same amount, etc., and is thus 
an “epistemic peer.”181 In either situation, the very fact that the 
other judge holds a given view constitutes at least some second-
order evidence of the truth of that view. 
Now, the crucial step is seeing that another valuable piece of 
information relevant to deciding how much weight to give another’s 
opinion is how certain the other person is of its truth. That is, in 
addition to knowing another judge’s opinion on a given matter, and 
knowing whether that judge is an epistemic superior, inferior, or 
peer as to that issue, one ought to be curious about that judge’s 
relative certainty. And upon learning another’s certainty level, one 
ought rationally to update one’s own view to take that into account. 
On the institutional level, then, insofar as we are concerned about 
the judiciary’s proper functioning as an epistemic system,182 we 
should want judges to provide that useful information to each 
other, and to have it influence each other’s processes of rational 
belief formation.183 
In sum, social epistemology shows how the judicial system can 
more effectively discover and retain truth, and ferret out and 
 
 180. Likewise, sometimes another judge simply has a reputation as a particularly bright 
or learned judge generally (hence the practice of noting an opinion’s authorship when it is 
written by a well-regarded jurist) or as to some specific substantive area of expertise (e.g., 
Judge Robert Sack on defamation, or Judge Frank Easterbrook on antitrust). 
 181. See Christensen & Lackey, supra note 178. 
 182. Recall that the judiciary’s goals are not exclusively epistemic. See, e.g., sources cited 
supra notes 12 and 150. 
 183. Cf. supra note 42 (analogizing to other epistemic institutions such as scientific fields 
and intelligence-gathering agencies, where relative certainty reporting is both more frequent 
and more precise than it is in the modern judiciary). 
A brief note is in order regarding social epistemology’s implications for the 
appropriate rhetorical baseline. By stressing the rationality of deference to epistemic peers’ 
disagreement, the field does suggest that uncertainty in an absolute sense is more often 
warranted than judicial opinions imply on their face (particularly in split opinions, though 
also in cases where at least one judge in the majority has reservations). I am ultimately 
sympathetic to this view, the arguments in section II.C notwithstanding. Still, for those who 
lament judges’ unwillingness to express uncertainty in the face of peer disagreement, the 
data examined in section I.B, supra, provide at least some cause for hope. Specifically, AU 
usage is higher in split opinions than in unanimous ones, see supra notes 110–115, and the 
data show a marginally significant increase in AU amongst ideologically diverse panels 
(unified panels had an average of 1.82 AUs per 10,000 words, versus 2.50 for nonunified 
panels (p = 0.09) (OLS: p = .35)); Appendix Table 2. So contrary to the “rhetorical escalation” 
account’s predictions, judges do seem willing to report uncertainty when confronted with 
peer disagreement, even if they should do so more often. 
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discard falsity, by candidly reporting confidence levels associated 
with legal and factual contentions. That, in a nutshell, is the upshot 
of social epistemology’s normative naturalism, its realistic focus on 
actual institutional capacities, and its acknowledgment of the 
inevitability and desirability of relying on others’ testimony during 
the process of rational belief-formation. What began this Part’s 
analysis as a tool for efficient management turns out also to be a 
means for more effective truth-discovery. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This Article set out to understand why judges and litigants so 
frequently employ certainty rhetoric despite seemingly universal 
disdain for it, as well as what effects it has and whether it is as 
undesirable as it is typically made out to be. The Article’s tentative 
conclusions represent only an initial step toward answering those 
questions, focusing on overt and unnecessary assertions of 
certainty and uncertainty, obviousness and nonobviousness, etc. 
After showing why common explanations of the causes and effects 
of certainty rhetoric fall short—leaving their associated normative 
claims open to doubt—this Article argued in favor of a rosier 
picture of certainty rhetoric, though one that may or may not 
ultimately justify the current certainty-laden discourse. 
I posited that a judicial preference for audience esteem and 
ongoing influence—in short, good reputation—helps constrain 
certainty rhetoric, making it largely sincere and informative. I then 
argued that the information which certainty rhetoric provides to 
judges, lawyers, and litigants is both relevant and useful, in ways 
that make it a powerful tool for appellate judges seeking to manage 
the judicial system efficiently in an era of increasing caseloads. In 
addition, norms of judicial certainty may have some salutary ex 
ante effects on judicial decision-making, partially justifying the 
high rhetorical certainty baseline characteristic of current judicial 
opinion rhetoric, even if it sometimes appears comically 
overwrought or misleading. At the very least, it is a good thing that 
judges report their relative certainty or uncertainty when it departs 
significantly from the rhetorical baseline, rather than staying silent 
as to degree of certainty, obviousness, and the like. And it is good 
not only for purposes of efficient management, but also for 
accomplishing the judicial system’s epistemic goals. 
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Before concluding, it is worth stressing some limitations of the 
present study. First, more empirical work would need to be done 
before Part I’s traditional explanatory accounts could be 
definitively rejected or Part II’s new account adopted with much 
confidence. As it stands, the empirical data reported in Part I open 
only an initial exploratory window into legal certainty rhetoric. 
Though the data are consistent with, and help render plausible, the 
explanatory account provided in Part II, the empirical study was 
designed to investigate the five accounts examined in Part I. 
Second, while the explanatory proposal in Part II may be applicable 
to judicial behavior outside the federal appellate courts, extra 
caution is warranted in generalizing beyond that context. For 
example, certainty rhetoric could have altogether different causes, 
effects, and normative implications in the small subset of Supreme 
Court cases that present highly publicized constitutional issues. 
Still, one should not ignore the possibility that the same mundane 
managerial and reputational concerns that give rise to certainty 
rhetoric in the mine-run of cases also help explain and partially 
justify it in those highly unusual, headline-worthy cases. 
Of course, one might be skeptical of any attempt to make 
generalizations or craft a theory concerning a practice so diverse as 
the use of certainty rhetoric in legal discourse. There may be such 
varied causes, effects, and normative implications of different 
instances of certainty rhetoric that any theory is bound to fail. But 
if that is true, then the conventional and seemingly universal 
disdain for certainty rhetoric, along with the assumptions that 
undergird it, rest on far more uncertain foundations than their 
proponents let on. Moreover, there would remain the mystery of 
why, despite being universally lamented, certainty rhetoric persists 
even among the very people who have been taught to, and have in 
some cases told others to, eschew it. Continuing to investigate that 
mystery can improve our understanding and evaluation of judicial 
and litigant behavior, facilitating better-supported normative 
prescriptions concerning legal discourse and decision-making. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Case, Opinion, and Brief Characteristics. 
Cases Total 428 100% 
    
Circuit 
5th Circuit 111 26% 
7th Circuit 173 40.5% 
9th Circuit 144 33.5% 
    
Subject Matter 
Fourth Amendment 130 30.4% 
Commercial Contracts 147 34.3% 
Combination Crim. / Civ. Pro. 151 35.3% 
    
Panel Ideological Unity184 Ideologically Unified 98  27% Ideologically Nonunified 263 73% 
Opinions Total 483 100% 
Majority, Separate 
Majority  428 88.6% 
Concurrences 23 4.8% 
Dissents 32 6.6% 
    
Author Attributes185 
Male 290 71% 
Female 121 29% 
White 370 90% 
Nonwhite 41 10% 
Elite law school graduate 211 51% 
Nonelite law school graduate 200 49% 
Briefs Total 344 100% 
Opening, Responsive 
Appellant Opening 121 35% 
Appellee Opposition  120 35% 
Appellant Reply 103 30% 
    
Author Attributes 
Federal Government 63 18% 
Top Law Firm 14 4% 
Other 268 78% 
  
 
 184. Percentages here concern the 361 cases for which the political party of all three 
judges on the panel was available via sources reporting federal appellate judges’ appointing 
president’s political party.  In the cases where no such data was available, one of the three 
judges was sitting by designation and not a federal appellate judge.  Cf. supra note 88. 
 185. Percentages here concern the 411 cases for which author demographics were 
available via sources reporting federal appellate judges’ appointing president’s political 
party.  In the cases where no such data was available, the authoring judge was sitting by 
designation and not a federal appellate judge.  Cf. supra note 88. 
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Table 2. The Five Theories’ Predictions, and Relevant Empirical 
Analyses. 
Theory Predictions Key Independent Variables 
Misguided 
Persuasion 
Higher quality judges use 
fewer ACs186 
Elite law school J.D. vs. 
nonelite law school J.D. 
Higher quality lawyers 
use fewer ACs 
Top law firm vs. not top law 
firm and non-fed. govt. 
Fed. govt. vs. not fed. govt. 
Judicial opinions using 
more ACs are less 
influential (at least 
outside their circuit) 
Op. ACs (increase of one 
unit)187 
Op. ACs (increase of one unit) 
Briefs using more ACs 
lose at higher rates 
Appellant Br. ACs (increase of 
one unit) – opening and reply 
combined 
Appellee Br. ACs (increase of 
one unit) 
Reactive 
Escalation 
Higher losing brief ACs 
result in higher opinion 
ACs 
Losing br. ACs 
Higher winning brief 
ACs result in higher 
opinion ACs 
Winning br. ACs 
In split opinions, both 
majority and dissent use 
more ACs and fewer 
AUs than in nonsplit 
opinions 
Dissent present vs. no dissent 
present 
  
 
 186. All ACs and AUs here are short for “ACs per 10,000 words” and “AUs per 10,000 
words” respectively. 
 187. See supra note 101 for an explanation of unit standardization. 
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 188. Underlined indicates effect in opposite direction of prediction. 
 189. “**” indicates statistical significance at the .05 level. “*” indicates marginal 
significance, at the 0.10 level. 
Dependent Variable Effect Size, 
Direction188 
Statistical 
Significance189 
Op. ACs 0.84 times as many ACs p = 0.33  
Br. ACs 0.77 times as many ACs p = 0.27 
Br. ACs 0.52 times as many ACs **p < 0.0001 
Inside-circuit citations 1.06 times more citations p = 0.71 
Outside-circuit 
citations 
1.07 times more 
citations p = 0.75 
Appellant win vs. 
appellant loss 
0.79 times as high odds 
of winning p = 0.30 
Appellee win vs. 
appellee loss 
1.23 times higher odds 
of winning p = 0.29 
Op. ACs 0.87 times as many ACs p = 0.14 
Op. ACs 1.002 times more ACs p = 0.98 
Op. ACs 2.81 times more ACs **p = 0.0001 
Op. AUs 2.64 times more AUs **p < 0.0001 
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Theory Predictions Key Independent 
Variables 
Extralegal 
Communication 
Racial minority judges 
use more AUs, fewer 
ACs than white judges 
and than male judges 
Nonwhite vs. white 
Female judges use 
more AUs, fewer ACs 
than white judges and 
than male judges 
Female vs. Male 
Power-Grabbing 
Ideologically unified 
panels use more ACs, 
fewer AUs than 
ideologically diverse 
panels 
Ideologically unified 
vs. ideologically 
diverse 
Legitimacy Bolstering 
Search & seizure cases 
contain more ACs than 
commercial cases 
Search & seizure cases  
vs. commercial cases 
Dissenting opinions 
contain fewer ACs 
than majority opinions 
without a dissent 
Dissent vs. maj. op. 
w/o dissent present 
Dissenting opinions 
contain fewer ACs 
than majority opinions 
with a dissent 
Dissent vs. maj. op. 
with dissent present 
Majority opinions in 
the presence of a 
dissent contain more 
ACs than opinions 
without a dissent 
present 
Maj. op. in presence of 
dissent vs. maj. op. not 
in presence of dissent 
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 190.  Underlined indicates effect in opposite direction of prediction. 
 191.  “**” indicates statistical significance at the .05 level. “*” indicates marginal 
significance, at the 0.10 level. 
 192. OLS: p = 0.08. 
 193. OLS: p = .35. 
 194. OLS: p = 0.13. 
Dependent Variable Effect Size, 
Direction190 
Statistical 
Significance191 
Op. ACs 0.79 times as many ACs p = 0.43 
Op. AUs 0.45 times as many AUs **p = 0.01 
Op. ACs 1.02 times more ACs p = 0.92 
Op. AUs 1.19 times more AUs p = 0.43192 
Op. ACs 0.85 times as many ACs p = 0.38 
Op. AUs 0.73 times as many AUs *p = 0.09
193 
Op. ACs 1.24 times more ACs p = 0.11  
Dissenting op. ACs 4.02 times more ACs **p < 0.0001 
Dissenting op. ACs 3.65 times more ACs **p = 0.001194 
Op. ACs 1.1 times more ACs p = 0.61 
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